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Power transmission networks are crucial. Every country requires the means to transport and deliver
energy, whether produced locally or in foreign countries. The paper deals with transnational power-
transmission networks, those aimed at delivering energy across borders. It considers the challenges
posed by transposing to the legal and regulatory fields the unique features of power grids in order
to foster transnational network interconnections and unrestrained power transit under international
law. The European Union 2020 Energy Policy and the European Transmission System, though still
unsuccessful in achieving the creation of a single electricity market, serve as a case study for an
enhanced model of regulation, with emphasis on the enforceability of power trading and transit
across national borders. The research advances that a well-framed, technically-based, dedicated scope
for transnational power grid interconnections and energy transit, at regional level, into ongoing
international trading schemes such as the WTO or an improved Energy Charter Treaty, would further
international power trading and synchronisation of energy matrices as drivers for international law
to achieve greater legitimacy and enforceability.
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States are compelled to make decisions on what power generating sources will drive their economies
and how to structure them to meet increasing power demand and other political goals, such as energy
security. It is apparent that, at least at domestic level, every country requires means to transport and
deliver energy produced by its own sources. While the kind of energy sources available may vary
widely depending on each country’s particular conditions, the need for a power transmission network
is unavoidable.
This enquiry deals with transnational power-transmission networks. Using a multidisciplinary
approach, it aims to explain the main features of power grids and the legal aspects embedded in
international power transmission operations. It considers the international law challenges posed by
transmitting electricity cross-border, as well as how some of the grids’ unique features might be
effectively transposed to the legal and regulatory fields to foster networks interconnections and secure
cross-border unrestrained transit of electricity. The European Union 2020 Energy Policy and the
European Transmission System serve as a case study as well as a potential approach for a single power
market’s enhanced model regulation, with an emphasis on the enforceability of power trading and
transit across national borders, policy concerns coming from cross border disputes, and examples of
how the system works in practice.
Through the comparative analysis of a particular regulatory system: Brazil, the paper aims at
assessing transnational (European Union) and international (European Energy Community and Energy
Charter Treaty) schemes as to their potential to foster cross-border power grids interconnections and
unrestrained power transit in regional non-integrated contexts. This paper advances the view that part
of the answer as to why countries are reluctant to interconnect their power grids are legal factors
inducing certain types of energy matrices mostly based on the use of carbon-based sources, as well as
the use of traditional understandings of sovereignty.
The paper ultimately proposes that a well-framed, technically-based, and dedicated international
legal scope for transnational power grid interconnections and power transit into ongoing international
trading schemes would further both international trade as a driver for international law to achieve
greater acceptance and, thus, enhanced enforceability.
II. POWER TRANSMISSION NETWORKS
The theme of this section is the transnational power transmission. It explains the main features of
power grids and how they might be effectively transposed to the legal and regulatory field in order to
foster interconnections. It examines the legal nature of international power transmission operations,
and the challenges posed by transmitting electricity across borders. In the light of this thematic
perspective, the European Union serves as the paradigm for a regulatory approach to the matter. The
analysis explores the EU 2020 policy, the European Transmission System, and the efforts towards
creating a single power market. The focus of the analysis is on the EU legal framework for power-trading
with, and transit across non EU-countries, whether through bilateral legal mechanisms (like
Cooperation and Energy Integration Agreements) or multilateral tools (like the Energy Community
Treaty and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)).
The following sections provide an overview of power transmission, its elements, and features as well
as some regulatory conditions making international power transmission possible. It will attempt, finally,
a legal conceptualization and classification of power transmission networks.
II.1. Transmission and power grid elements
Transmission (from Latin transmission, -onis) denotes the act of passing something on from one
person or place to another.1 When this comes to power transmission, it refers specifically to the process
of delivering electricity from one point to another (called nodes). Over time, the concept has been
refined and restricted only to the transfer of high-voltage electricity from generating step-up units
to substation step-down transformers.
The concept of power transmission conveys at least three elements: first, an entity (either an
individual or a juridical person e.g., a generating power unit) acting as a remitter in a designated point
1Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary.
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of origin; second, a recipient entity (likewise) in a different place as the final destination and, lastly,
something which is carried and delivered between such two points.
From a legal point of view, these elements are relevant since they refer to legal problems
common to decision-making and regulatory processes, such as acquisition of property and
proprietorship issues, risk management, and dispute resolution mechanisms.
II.2. Characteristics of power grids
Two basic features associated with all grids are functionality and robustness. The former refers to
the primary function of a power grid operating under normal conditions which is to transport blocks
of energy; the latter refers to the fact that transmission networks must be designed to fulfil such
function and to transfer bulk power and withstand network failure events, either involving single
or multiple network’s components as well as such events occurring either separately or in any
credible combination.2
The economic operation is an outcome of grid expansion processes and the rise of investment
and construction costs. Although grid operation is constrained by power transfer capacities and
engineering needs, under normal conditions, it is cost-efficient where marginal power generating
units are dispatched,3 full transfer capacity is in use, and transmission losses are kept the
least possible.
The grid is also said to be double-focused, because it both conveys electricity and also serves a load
balancing function, physically matching supply and demand of power.4 Conventional power grids are
designed for given parameters of real and reactive power as well as load requirements, thus,
substantial deviations from them require compensation devices to regulate load voltage. The so-called
‘smart’ power grids are said to be responsive to real load-demands and rapid time-variability of inputs.
Contemporary electric utilities not only produce power for consumers but also pool and coordinate
volatile excess power among them,5 thus, making excess power trading possible.
In sum, power transmission networks are, therefore, networks of interconnected high
to very high-voltage transmission lines,6 substations and transformers that enable
bulk-carrying of electrons flow (electrical energy) from one place to another and, ultimately,
the delivery of power from generation sources to areas of demand.7 Electricity transmission
grids can be classified into two major subgroups: bulk transmission grids8 and
2The failure of a single element of a grid e.g., a transformer or a transmission line, is referred to as an ‘N-1’ event.
Simultaneous failures of multiple elements such as that of a transmission line when a parallel line has been disconnected
for maintenance, are termed ‘N-2’ events. In any case, the transmission network should be capable of holding up such
events to be considered ‘robust’, as opposed to a ‘weak’ grid.
3In other words, the cheapest generating unit.
4Electric load is the amount of electric power delivered or required at any specific node (or point) or nodes on a
system. Power load balancing refers to the function of reducing energy costs by storing electric power during low demand
periods to use it as demand rises. This functionality can be carried out by power facilities (power stations, transmission
facilities, etc.) using several techniques (3-phase distribution system according to NEC Art calculation, the so-called NEMA
method or IEEE, the mathematics-based symmetrical components method, just to name a few). On power grids’ load
balancing function see generally Santacana, E, Rackliffe, G, Tang, L, Feng, X, Getting Smart Power and Energy Magazine,
8(2) IEEE (March-April 2010) 41-48 (available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp¼&arnumber¼5430489&
url¼http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fxpls%2Fabs_all.jsp%3Farnumber%3D5430489). For a current view on the
exercise of this functionality through an innovative adaptive pole-placement control strategy as proposed control system,
see particularly Araujo Ribeiro, R. L., de Acevedo, C.C., de Sousa, R.M., A robust adaptive control strategy of active power
filters for Power-factor correction, harmonic compensation, and balancing of non-linear loads in IEEE Transactions on
power Electronics 27(2), 718-730 (February 2012) (available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp¼&arnum
ber¼5942190&url¼http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fxpls%2Fabs_all.jsp%3Farnumber%3D5942190). In addition
to power load balancing, energy savings can also be created through load scheduling, a technique consisting on agreed-
upon power transactions specifying all particulars (megawatts, start and end time, rate, type of power delivery and receipt)
between the contracting parties and the grid operator involved in the transaction.
5Günther Oettinger, An integrated and competitive electricity market: a stepping stone to a sustainable future (Speech
delivered at the Eurelectric Conference: ‘Building a secure and sustainable future: how can market integration
contribute’,Brussels, (March 17, 2010) (available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference¼SPEECH/
10/102&format¼HTML&aged¼0&language¼EN&guiLanguage¼en).
6Overhead, underground, or undersea power-transmission lines of insulated conductors.
7Either large customers directly connected to the transmission network or, most commonly, power distribution companies.
8Transmission network voltages are typically above 100 kV and, in general, the higher the voltage the larger the network’s
transfer capacity. High voltage transmission canbesplit into twosubsections: extra (very highvoltage transmission, over 230 kV
up to about 800 kV) and ultra high-voltage power transmission lines (higher than 800 kV). Claverton Energy-Research Group,
HVDC (February 22, 2011) Claverton Energy (http://www.claverton-energy.com/tag/hvdc).
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distribution grids.9 Due to one of the tensions described next,10 this inquiry is restricted in scope
to the former.
III. TRANSNATIONAL POWER TRANSMISSION: FERTILE GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
As a general proposition, international law is commonly regarded as a fragmentary body of rules.
Its provisions are not necessarily designed to cover a given field of law exhaustively; instead, the
provisions provide minimalistic procedural legal principles to deal with situations having an
international element, leaving the bulk of detailed regulation to domestic fora. Power-transmission is
normally a heavily regulated activity at domestic level. Additionally, amongst national legal systems,
there might be tensions as to the legal characterization of electric power11 and how to balance
individual jurisdiction’s regulatory goals with transnational transmission. In contrast, there is little
regulation of transboundary power transmission in the international realm which this paper considers
advantageous, as it shall be seen shortly. In order to foster cross-border interconnections, this section
analyses how relevant features of power grids might be efficiently transposed to the international
legal field.
It is proposed that transboundary power transmission presents a number of advantages for making
international law to achieve greater levels of substantiveness and, thus, enforceability. The argument
rests upon the following. First, cross-border transmission is largely a technical matter in which the how-
to-do-it question is basically resolved. Second, the idea of interconnecting grids of different countries is
strongly supported by economics: the achievement of economies of scale, cost reductions, integration
of new generating units, and a resulting enhanced market undoubtedly favour its consideration. Third,
not even the common characterization of transmission grids as monopolistic (or oligopolistic) markets
prevents states from getting their facilities interconnected because, as long as a proper regulation on
these imperfect markets is set up, the shortcomings of a monopolistic operation can effectively be
9The technology for high power transmission referred to is ^800 kV high voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission,
designed to long-distance power transmission (over 7,000 kms for direct current and 4,000 for alternating current). This type
of power transmission system can convey approximately 6.5 GW through a single bipole (i.e., two conductor bundles – one for
each pole – on each electrical tower) overhead line system. Thereafter, when further transmission systems are built, on a
double bipole system, it can transport twice the power. Distribution grids operate regularly beneath 100 kV and their
purpose is to distribute power from the transmission network to end-users. Currently, setting aside wind and other
renewable power sources (mostly experimental), not as much of generation is connected to distribution networks (and
when it does, it is called ‘embedded generation’). Like its transfer capacity, its reliability is also less than those of a
transmission network. Distribution networks are operated by distribution systems operators (DSOs), ibid.
10The tension concerning the legal characterization of electric power. See section III as well as n. 12 below.
11From a comparative law point of view, domestic legal systems can deem electric power either as a good or a service. A
good overview of the divergent legal positions on the matter in the U.S. courts, for instance, can be found in Energy Law
Bulletin, Electricity: A “Good” under the UCC. Should be a Simple Question – Right? (April 2005) Morrison & Foerster
(http://faculty.law.miami.edu/rrosen/courses/documents/05kelectricityagood_000.pdf). Considering it a ‘highly
differentiated technology service’ is Lynne Kiesling, Electricity: Commodity or Service? (August, 2005) The Reconstruction,
Economics, Energy and the Environment (http://www.thereconstruction.org/2005/08/11/electricity-commodity-or-service/).
As a general statement, market-based economies (and appurtenant legal systems) tend to consider electric power as a
tradeable good or merchandise, ultimately a commodity. This is an approach largely based upon apprehensible physical
features of electricity. It was largely the internal European approach before the launch of its new external policy on energy.
See generally, Treaty on European Union or Maastricht Treaty (EU Treaty), opened for signature February 7 1992,
consolidated version [2008] O.J. C115/1 (entered into force on November 1 1993). The EU Treaty was amended by the Treaty
of Amsterdam, opened for signature October 2 1997 OJ C 340/1 (entered into force May 1 1999); the Treaty of Nice
amending the TEU, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, opened for signature
February 26 2001, [2001] O.J. C80/1 (entered into force February 1 2003), and by the Lisbon Treaty or Treaty of the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), opened for signature June 20 2007 OJ C 306/1 (entered into force December 1
2009) art 4(1)-(2). The consolidated version can be found in: Maastricht Treaty (EU Treaty), [2008] O.J. C115/1. See also
generally, as to electricity in the EU Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 26 2003
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [2003] OJ L 176/37; Directive 2005/89/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of January 18 2006 concerning measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and
infrastructure investment [2006] OJ L 33/22;. Finally, see particularly as to the EU approach discussed in the main text
Directive 2003/54/EC of June 26 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing
Directive 96/92/EC [2003] OJ L 176/37; Directive 2003/96/EC, of October 27 2003, of the European Parliament and of the
Council, restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (the ‘Energy Taxation
Directive’) [2003] OJ L 283. In contrast, centralized and social-market economies’ approach tend to lie more upon a social
welfare function attributed to electricity supply and, therefore, as something more than the simply sum of individual
utilities, in other words, a service. Further, within national systems, the electric power legal characterization issue cannot be
totally ruled out. It is still possible to legally conceive electricity as a good or commodity in regard to bulk transmission
networks dealing with wholesale power purchases whilst having a legal service-based approach to power distribution, i.e.,
the market reaching end-consumers.
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overcome. Due to the capital-intensive nature of supplying electricity and diminishing costs of
generating units and transmission line construction, it is far more cost-effective to spread these
costs over the large customer-base provided by a monopolistic market set-up, rather than create
the opposite effect if widespread competition were allowed between smaller economic agents
(e.g. transmission facilities owners) among which economies of scale can hardly be achieved.
Finally, the fact that several countries may depend on energy provided by a non-neighbouring country,
requiring power to cross the territory of states having vested interests in any of the formers, might
incentivize the interconnection of the grids, assure permanent supply, and further mechanisms
of enforcement.12
Along with advantages, transnational power transmission might also represent substantive policy
concerns connected with potential cross-border disputes. Setting aside engineering technical
challenges of laying a transmission line and commercial aspects of substantive deals, relevant policy
issues are the physical operating control over transmission facilities, the territorial regime over lands or
waters bearing power lines, and most importantly investment and transit issues, particularly, involving
third countries. A classic approach would answer these policy questions straightforwardly: territorial
sovereignty cannot be discussed nor negotiated. Contemporary approaches, however, see things
differently. International law has envisaged mechanisms to allocate actual possession and control over
tracks of land/waters to third parties for limited and specific purposes.13 While still acknowledging
eminent domain over these areas to the traditional national legal owner; in some particular cases (and
mostly when dominion itself is under discussion) a given territory can be neutralized. These problems
are most commonly addressed in a practical manner through non-binding protocols for
interconnection or more generally through bilateral energy integration agreements. These kinds of
arrangements normally assume that land control belongs to the country owning the territory, whilst all
matters pertaining to the interconnection itself, operation, testing, as well as the maintenance of the
facilities must be coordinated by technical bodies designated by both parties involved. Let us analyse
this in more detail using the example of Brazil and Paraguay with regard to the Itaipú dam. This is a
case in which transnational measures have effectively contributed to solve problems faced by two
nations in exploiting bordering natural resources. It illustrates how transnational power-generation and
transmission undertakings can become cooperative drivers of shared-management, natural resource
preservation, and peaceful resolution of conflicts.
Historical territorial conflicts between Brazil and Paraguay over the Salto Grande de Sete Quedas,
home to the Itaipú dam, date back to 1750. While the 1872 Peace Treaty failed to resolve the boundary
claims to each country,14 in 1966 Brazil and Paraguay agreed to jointly explore the feasibility to exploit
the hydroelectric potential of De la Plata basin as part of the Iguazú Declaration.15 A year later, the
Brazil-Paraguay Mixed Technical Commission was created to conduct feasibility studies for the
proposed facility; and an international tender process was initiated to choose the contractors for
building the 14 gigawatt Itaipú hydro-electrical dam on the Paraná River.
12In regard to primeval mechanisms of enforcement in the realm of International Private Law see, Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, opened for signature 27 September, 1968, 8
ILM 229 (entered into force February 1, 1973).
13Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) 241. The book explains how the
principles of sovereignty and territoriality have been undermined by piecemeal developments. Particularly interesting is
Howard J. Taubenfeld, The Antarctic and Outer Space: An Analogy in retrospect in Joyner, Christopher and Chopra, Sudhir K.
The Antarctic Legal Regime (Martinus Hijhoff Publishers/Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988) 269. The article is worth
looking at since deals with a comparison of two not so different regimes to address jurisdictional matters in areas where a
strict application and/or enforcement of the principle of territorial sovereignty is not exempted of serious difficulties:
Antarctica and Outer Space. See also Darrel C. Menthe, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: a theory on International Spaces, 4
Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 69 (1998), section V ‘theory for international spaces’ and section I for an overview on
Principles of jurisdiction. See also p 88 et seq. sub-section C.2. Jurisdiction in Antarctica among the ‘case for international
spaces’ (available at http://mttlr.org/volfour/menthe.pdf). As to Antarctica, particularly, see Donald R. Rothwell, The Polar
Regions and the development of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1996); Todd P, Chatham, Criminal
jurisdiction in Antarctica: a proposal for dealing with jurisdictional uncertainty and lack of effect of enforcement 24(1)
Emory International Law Review, 331-356 (2010); Harold G. Maier, Jurisdictional rules in Customary International Law, in
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Theory and Practice 64, 67 (Karl M. Meessen ed., 1996); Keith D. Suter, Antarctica: private
property or public heritage? (Zed Books, 1991).
14The 1872 Peace Treaty put an end to the so-called ‘War of Paraguay’.
15Declaração de Assunção sobre o aproveitamento de rios internacionais, signed on June 3 1971, art 5, 6 [Assunção
Declaration on exploitation of international watercourses].
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Late in 1973, the Parties entered into the Itaipú Treaty.16 Despite much criticism of this instrument,
the treaty is interesting for several reasons. One of them is the treatment in the treaty of
sovereignty-sensitive resources (water) and territorial issues. Firstly, the treaty fully acknowledged the
bi-national nature and co-ownership regime over hydro resources in the relevant track of the Paraná
River.17 Secondly, it contains a sovereignty-safeguard clause whereby the construction of the electricity
facilities shall neither alter the status quo ante in regard to national border delimitation nor confer on
any party jurisdiction or property rights over any part of the other nation’s territory.18 However, the
Itaipú Treaty finally overcame a long-standing territorial dispute, by, literally, flooding the area in
dispute. It is interesting too, that it created a bi-national entity: Itaipú, to which both nation-state
parties granted a concession to exploit the hydro potential of the Paraná River19 in return for royalties
flowing to each nation.20 However, the central point for consideration in respect of the present thesis is
the power distribution agreement enshrined in Art. XIII. According thereto, the entire Itaipú power
output shall be divided equally between Brazil and Paraguay, the treaty recognizes that each party has
the right to acquire the excess power not domestically consumed by the other. The parties also agreed
to acquire the entire production of the installed capacity.21 Finally, Art. XV paragraph 3 establishes as
an element of the cost of the service provided by Itaipú, a certain amount which is set aside to
remunerate the party assigning power surpluses.22
In 1984, the Itaipú hydro plant commenced operation but new problems began to emerge. Argentina
feared Brazil’s control over the floodgates for the dam was regarded as a security threat posed to
Buenos Aires in the event that the floodgates were opened. These external security issues were
resolved through a tripartite agreement.23 Paraguay claimed that a strict interpretation of the treaty as
to the exclusive nature of the power-surpluses acquisition right24 adversely affects its commercial
options. Paraguay as well cast doubts upon the ‘fairness’ of the amount payable to the
power-assigning party.25 This is of the utmost commercial importance because, although Paraguay
enjoys enormous power-surpluses, it is not allowed, under the terms of the treaty, to sell it to third
parties even if they are willing to pay higher prices than those provided in the Agreement. Under the
Itaipú Treaty, Paraguay can only assign surpluses to Eletrobrás (Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S.A.) the
publicly-owned Brazilian energy company. As a result of diplomatic negotiations held over the past few
years, as of 2023, Paraguay’s State-owned national electricity utility, Administración Nacional de
Electricidad (ANDE), will be authorized to sell power-surpluses to Brazilian companies other than
Eletrobrás and to third party countries as well.26 This will result in a more widely distributed
transnational power sharing process.
Relationships between Brazil and Paraguay may continue to improve with the realisation of the
500 kilovolt Villa Hayes transmission line, a project valued at USD$ 400 million which is intended
16Tratado entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República do Paraguai para o aproveitamento hidroelétrico dos
Recursos Hı́dricos do Rio Paraná, pertencentes em condomı́nio aos dois paı́ses, desde e inclusive o Salto Grande de Sete
Quedas ou Salto de Guairá até a Foz do Rio Iguaçú [Treaty between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of
Paraguay for the hydroelectric exploitation of water resources of the Paraná River, belonging in a condominium to both
countries, from and including the Salto Grande Seven Falls or Guairá Falls to Foz do Iguaçú River], opened for signature
April 26 1973, UNTS 13164 (entered into force April 26 1973), art XXIII.
17In other words, from and including Salto Grande de Sete Quedas [Salto Grande Seven Falls] (also known as Guairá
Falls) to Foz do Rio Iguaçú [Foz do Iguaçú River].
18Above n 17, art VII.
19Ibid arts III, V.
20Ibid art XV (1).
21Ibid art XIV. In the manner set forth therein.
22Ibid art XIV (3), Annex C.
23Acordo Tripartite entre Brasil, Paraguai e Argentina para aproveitamento dos recursos hidráulicos no trecho do Rio
Parana desde as Sete Quedas até a foz do Rio da Prata [Tripartite Agreement between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina to
the use of water resources in the stretch of the Parana River from the Seven Falls to the mouth of the River Plate] opened for
signature October 19 1979, 2216 UNTS I-39389 (entered into force December 5 1979).
24Differences in the interpretation of this point go back to a Treaty’s antecedent: the Foz do Iguaçú Statement,
according to which both countries shall have a ‘preferential right’ to buy each other’s power surpluses, which shall also be
acquired for a ‘fair price’. However, this wording was not transferred into the current Itaipú Treaty, leading to the
construction of an exclusive power-surplus acquisition right.
25See ABC Digital, Lugo deja renegociación de Itaipú en manos de voluntad del Brasil (2010) ABC Digital (http://www.
abc.com.py).
26Declaração de Assunção sobre o aproveitamento de rios internacionais, signed on June 3 1971, art 5, 6 [Assunção
Declaration on exploitation of international watercourses]. In fact, it has been informed that the then current payment of
USD$ 120 million for that concept would increase up to USD$ 360 million.
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to be carried out by Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay once funding has been agreed upon.27
It is remarkable that, despite its formal multinational character, the project will provide an improvement
to Paraguay’s poor power-transmission infrastructure. Paraguay’s transmission network is made up of
only seven 220 kilovolt lines totalling approximately 3566 kilometers. Its scarce and unsophisticated
transmission infrastructure sharply contrasts with its huge generation capacity. The reason why the
network in Paraguay remains to date so simple is, basically, because the most important lines belong
to the bi-national stations. These lines mostly convey power towards Brazil and Argentina, while the
remainder goes to feed the distribution system focused mainly on the east part of the country. In fact,
the Paraguayan transmission capacity28 lies far behind that of Uruguay which, though having much
less power capacity, enjoys a widespread power transport network.29 Apart from the transport coverage
issue, the Paraguay network is well-known for having serious efficiency and reliability weaknesses.
Therefore, in the context of the bilateral relationships between Brazil and Paraguay in which the
Itaipú transnational power distribution issues are central, it is quite understandable why Brazil is willing
to promote the Villa Hayes’ transmission line project which will assist in improving Paraguay’s
inadequate electricity transmission infrastructure, even funding it either in whole or part. The Itaipú
hydro-electrical dam thus represents not only an example of cross-border interconnection, but also a
cooperative approach towards energy integration in the transmission area and a working example of
transnational grid interconnection in South America.
Potential differences as to legal systems do not represent unsurmountable problems, particularly
when mutually beneficial economic interests are at stake. However, each system might give particular
policy responses as how to consider the transaction and what would the appropriate legal treatment
be accorded thereto. Further, energy integration agreements usually set forth that the legal framework
applicable to energy purchases, power exports/imports, and transmission shall be that of each party,
what is – true be told – next to nothing. Indeed, this situation leads first to the problem of determining
which are the domestic rules applicable—a matter of comparative law; and, secondly, in the absence of
conflict of law rules or any specific and expressed clause in the relevant agreement, chances for a
dispute to arise on the transnational effects of the transaction are high.30 In turn, a multilateral trading
27Through contributions to MERCOSUR’s Convergence Structural Fund. MERCOSUR Fondo de Convergencia Estructural
(FOCEM) (www.mercosur.int/focem).
28Paraguay has only 9 km of high-voltage lines per 1000 km2, totalling 3566 kms. Centro de Estudios Económicos,
La energı́a eléctrica Paraguaya en un marco regional (Unión Industrial Paraguaya, 2009) [Centre for Economic Studies,
Paraguayan electricity within a regional framework].
29Even though totalling just 4330 kms, Uruguay has 25 kms of high-voltage lines per 1000 km2, thus, leading with this
ratio the regional transmission coverage ranking. Comisión de Integración Energética Regional (CIER), Regional Statistics
(2007) CIER (www.cier.org) [Regional Commission for Energy Integration].
30In such an uncertain zone, where no particular governing-law clause can be called to settle a dispute, international
trade law principles might provide some relief. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL, a
subsidiary body of the General Assembly of the United Nations) has crafted some solutions which are ‘acceptable to States
having different legal systems and levels of economic and social development’ through processes of harmonization and
unification of the law of international trade. Whilst harmonization refers to the amendment of domestic laws ‘to enhance
predictability in cross-border commercial transactions’; unification seeks a ‘common legal standard governing particular
aspects of international business transactions’. UNCITRAL has produced several conventions (i.a. 1980 United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods – CISG), model laws (i.a. 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public
Procurement), legislative guides (i.a. 2007 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions), and rules (i.a. 2010
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) embodying international trade principles and rules acceptable worldwide towards which
conflicting parties might resort in settling a trade dispute. See UNCITRAL (http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/index.html). An
intergovernmental organisation created by a multilateral agreement thus enjoying independent international status, the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) has as its basic statutory objective ‘to prepare modern
and where appropriate harmonised uniform rules of private law understood in a broad sense’. Interestingly, however,
UNIDROIT declares that ‘experience has demonstrated a need for occasional incursion into public law, especially in areas
where hard and fast lines of demarcation are difficult to draw or where transactional law and regulatory law are
intertwined’. The instruments drawn up by UNIDROIT deals largely with the unification of substantive law rules; they only
address uniform conflict of laws rules incidentally. See UNIDROIT (http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid¼103284).
Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is the author’s opinion that in the absence of an specific body of rules dealing
with transnational power transactions as it would be under an improved ECT/WTO framework and lacking a clear
substantive governing law suited to such commercial practice (as it would be a determined national law set forth in the
contract); or, at the very least, a predictable set of conflict of laws rules, UNCITRAL’s common legal standards (unification
process-originated) ought to be pre-eminently considered. This proposition is based on several reasons: firstly and
pragmatically, these standards enjoy widespread acceptance within the UN constituency; secondly, because UNCITRAL’s
most suitable instruments to deal with cross-border power transmission disputes (i.a. 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules)
are non-substantive laws, precisely the legal character of the type of problems common to power transmission disputes as
well as the most difficult to resolve (for instance, cross-border power supply interruption operated by a transit-country).
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setting having more than one suitable provider or a regional trade agreement might also give birth to
disputes, since the particulars of power business transactions may constitute barriers to trade in the
terms of the World Trade Organization (WTO)/Energy Charter Treaty (ETC) frameworks; or, worse,
constitute a transit dispute outside those general trading frameworks involving third states.31
In sum, despite above referred to concerns and arguably because of them, cross-border transmission
provides an interesting opportunity for international law to improve its acceptance, legitimacy and
enforceability. To achieve this, the legal character of international power transmission operations shall
first be analysed.
III.1. Nature of transnational power transmission operations
Some legal concepts and interests relate directly to power transmission – electric power nature, energy
matrix, ownership of the facilities and the electricity, amongst the most relevant. However, there are
also different legal regimes that may – or may not – have a common understanding on what electricity
is and/or enforce such legal interests in a way consistent with promoting interconnections. Regarding
with the first two elements of power transmission: a remitter in a designated point of origin and a
recipient in a different final destination, it is crucial to bear in mind that power – although it may be
consumed domestically or destined to be sold beyond the frontiers of the state in which it is being
produced – is always generated and distributed locally and, therefore, it is primarily the focus of
domestic regulation which inextricably concerns the configuration of energy matrices or the problem of
energy selection. In contrast, power transmission is per se not locally-constrained, thus, rendering
international law particularly suitable for handling cross-border power exchanges.32 Let us analyse
both aspects through examples.
An energy matrix is a mix of energy sources that a given country/area/community employs to carry
out its economic production and social objectives. It is a strategic instrument of economic policy
designed to meet a country’s energy demand in a given period of time, based both on current available
resources and energy demand projections. Energy planning instruments are designed as a response to
different situations of energy supply disruptions or vulnerability. However, the way in which such
scenarios can be addressed to determine the best solution might differ radically when looking at them
in broader contexts, beyond a traditional notion of sovereignty.
Where power excess generation is sent transboundary (interconnected grids implied and generally in
mere bilateral contexts), the underlying legal transaction is characterized as an international purchase
of electricity, an export, which constitutes international power trading to which WTO rules, therefore,
apply.33 As to the third element: what it is conveyed through the grid and delivered between such two
points, electricity is a electrons-flow, a fungible element34 which once injected into the grid through a
Footnote continued
Indeed, these problems are akin more to the exercise of sovereign powers, the control over territory, facilities, and natural
resources or jurisdictional issues, thus to public international law; rather than to mere aspects of private international law.
This proposition is reinforced even by the UNIDROIT’s realm, UNIDROIT has acknowledged the shortcomings of private
international law in certain areas (in the author’s opinion, being transnational power transmission one of them). Finally,
although UNCITRAL deals with the laws applicable to private parties in international transactions and its scope and
approach is clearly different to that of contemporary WTO, as long as both the WTO and by reference the ECT framework
seem inadequate to address transit and third parties issues, resorting to UNCITRAL arbitration rules appears suitable.
31As to specific concerns derived from transit disputes, see Russia-Ukraine case at III.3.4; see also n. 78 below.
32Indeed, the very idea of transmission conveys the existence of at least two different places. If they happen to be sited
on different state jurisdictions the suitability of international rules get even highlighted.
33By international power trading we mean cross-border exchanges of electric power subject to international trade rules,
largelyWorld Trade Organization’s including the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement (CVA). For an illustrative article on the
potential of transboundary power trading see Aharon Amit, Smart Electrification: the win-win solution for sustainable world
trade in World Trade Organization (WTO), World Trade Report 2010 (June 2010), (available at www.wto.org/english/res_e/
publications_e/wtr10_forum_e/wtr10_18june10_e.thm). The author is the General Secretary and CEO of the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), a global developer of International Standards in the field of electricity, electronics and
associated technologies. See also, Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (with Final Act
embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annexes and Protocol) (Marrakesh),
opened for signature April 15 1994, 1867 UNTS I-31874 (entered into force January 1 1995).
34The question of whether or not electric power is a fungible or an intangible commodity has been long scholarly
debated. In some jurisdictions, power is stated to be a service rather than a tradeable good. For an introductory approach
see Jeff Vail Law Office LLC (Litigation Strategy and Innovation), Why does fungibility matter (and where did it go)?
(available at http://www.jeffvail.net/2008/10/why-does-fungibility-matter-and-where.html). A good approach to fungibility
from a technical point of view in regard to energy sources can be found in NTNU Trondheim, November 6, 2002, Lecture in
Electric Conversion, Systems and methods for electric generation – PowerPoint PPT presentation at (http://www.powers
how.com/view/102b35-OThiY/From_Renewables_to_Electrical_Power_and_Fungible_Energy_powerpoint_ppt_presentati
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nodal point, becomes physically and legally undistinguishable from other loads presently transported
through the grid. From the international trade law perspective, electricity is deemed as a good,
a commodity;35 an approach that avoids one of the tensions common in domestic realms, as much
as it supports this paper’s finding that the well-framing of international instruments as to their
subject-matter (bulk power/commodity transfers), might facilitate international consensus on
interconnections.36
Therefore, power transmission operations occur where electricity is transported across borders of
different countries which power grids are somehow interconnected. From the standpoint of the most
relevant specific operations involved in power-transmission i.e., power injections/withdrawals, transit,
and load-balancing,37 the distinctive international element arise from these activities taking place and
having effects in different countries.
III.2. Conditions for transnational transmission to assist international law
To assist enhancing the legitimacy of international law, a framework of cross-border interconnected
power networks and harmonised domestic energy matrices (preferably based on renewable sources) is
required. Such a framework calls for both technical and economic compatibility as well as for a specific
common driving force.
Of all conditions upon which renewable energy mixes configuration and transboundary
interconnection lies, technical compatibility is the less troublesome.38 Indeed, current technology
Footnote continued
on). From a legal point of view, see Bunge Corp. v. Recker, U.S. Ct of App, 8th Cir, 1975; Restatement (Second) of Contracts
Ch 16 (1981). The paper’s argument is based upon the assumption that the distinction is essential in the domestic realm
more than in the international community’s, this latter in which international law attempts imposing constraints over
sovereign powers. Furthermore, domestically and by large, in market-based economies only the distribution of electricity is
deemed a service; not the generation and transmission sectors. The argument of this paper is, precisely, that well-framed,
technically-based interconnection and transit agreements might strengthen international law’s enforceability and,
therefore, pave the way to substitute the current predominant view at international level of electric power as a mere good
or commodity and– over time –to replace it with one in which cross-border supply of electricity through interconnected
power grids be considered more as a service between nations and, therefore, triggering State liability whether in securing
delivery and/or unobstructed power transit.
35International Convention on the harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS Nomenclature) from the
Customs Co-Operation Council, also informally known as the ‘World Customs Organization’ (WCO), which code (heading)
2716 refers to ‘Electricity energy’ under chapter 27 which, interestingly, comprises ‘Mineral fuels, mineral oils and product of
their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes’. The nomenclature governed by the above referred to Convention
is an international multipurpose nomenclature which was elaborated under the auspices of the World Customs
Organisation (WCO). Currently, consistent treatment is given by the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement (CVA). The
objective of the HS Nomenclature agreement is ‘[t]o facilitate international trade by establishing a uniform system for
the collection, comparison and analysis of international trade statistics, and for the transmission of data and trade
documentation, and through the establishment in the states party of tariff and statistical nomenclatures in conformity with
an international harmonised system’. The Annex on the HS Nomenclature is an integral part of the Convention and
comprises about 5,000 commodity groups identified by a 6-digit code. The HS Committee is entrusted with providing the
official interpretation of the HS Nomenclature and ensuring its uniform interpretation worldwide. More than 98 per cent of
all goods traded in the world are classified according to the HS. In turn, The European Union integrates the HS
Nomenclature in a Combined Nomenclature of hers comprising additional subdivisions. See the Protocol of Amendment to
the International Convention on the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System, opened for signature June 24
1986 [1986] OJ L 198/11-409 (entering into force July 20, 1987). See European External Action Services, (http://ec.europa.
eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=512).
36It is worth noting that over time and under a progressive construction, the paper’s argument (which emphasizes
interconnections and unrestrained transit) might well contribute to develop the next stage on international law
characterization of electric power: no longer seen as mere bulk commodity-trading (largely between private entities and
subject to be interrupted by non legal-based considerations of domestic jurisdictions) See, for instance, in re Pacific Gas
And Electric Co, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22023 (September 30, 2004); but, ultimately, as a continuing service between
contracting States pledging their State liability (as subject of international law) as to secure unobstructed transit/delivery
of electricity.
37Frequency regulation. Frequency is the number of complete alternations or cycles per second of an alternating current
measured in Hertz. See US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14th, 2003 Blackout in the
United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations (April 2004), p 214 available at (https://reports.energy.gov/
BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf).
38From an historical point of view, four decades ago, electricity could only be efficiently transferred 600 kms. Further
scientific breakthroughs allowed distant transfer capacity to increase up to 2,500 kms. Current technology transmission
schemes of high voltage alternate current (HVAC) and high voltage direct current (HVDC) have extended the transmission
distance to 4,000 and 7,000 km respectively. Current high-voltage wires, known as superconductors, are designed to allow
power transmission at lower current, thus, generating less heat and consequently less energy loss in the process.
See Centre for Energy website (available at http://www.centreforenergy.com). In regard to renewable connection to the grid
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transmission schemes of superconductors have expanded transmission capacity and carrying-
distances, reducing energy-losses, and making possible crossing time-zones, seasonal demand
compensation, pooling, and more effective electrical-flow coordination.
As to economic compatibility, studies39 on limits and costs of long-distance transmission systems
have consistently reached the conclusion that – even exploitation of remote energy sources at low
cost ‘[is] feasible and economical for distances never before entertained’,40 offering acceptable
reliability levels and costs small enough41 as to make convenient its economic exploitation. Currently,
rising costs of conventional fuels and superconductors’ technology reaffirm the economic conclusion.
In turn, the economic convenience of long-distance transmission is answered in two ways. On the
one hand, high voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission schemes42 experience negligible electric
power unit cost increases when transmission-distances go up.43 On the other hand, upward variations
in the cost of power produced close to demand centres (as determined by market prices) bring about
notable variations of kilometres in competitive distances of remote sources.
Transboundary transmission poses several questions: whether it would be more efficient to have a
single or multiple markets; what the features of such market(s) would look like; and how the share of
participants’ market-power would be calculated. Transnational grids are a means to deliver reliable,
secure, and efficient power supply. Reliability is, for the greater part, a technical issue; whilst security of
supply relies mostly on international regulatory aspects. Efficiency, however, pertains to the field of
economics. To understand the economic efficiency problem of a transnational network, two ideas must
be emphasized: that it is a global macroeconomic endeavour which effects are meant to reach local
economies; and that pursuing economic efficiency leads to market-structure.
The third condition is a common supra-national interest driving policy-making process. Human
economic behaviour is normally driven by the pursuit of an interest. Though usually true at individual
level, it can be quite different when looking at social conduct, i.e., at what motivates joint-actions
by a group of people living in a social framework, either domestic or international. In this sense,
a supranational interest is one that transcends boundaries or spheres of interest held by separate
nations. It is about governments understanding and acknowledging that achieving some targets goes
well beyond a single country’s capability and that they could be sooner and better achieved through
joint efforts. Under what conditions, then, may one expect the development of supranational/inter-
national authority and a common policy on worldwide grid interconnection?
Recalling pioneers’ path, like the ECC and EURATOM,44 one might be tempted to first confine the
transmission sector of the energy industry, then to regulate it, and finally – if applicable or needed –
to deregulate it.45 But, is it necessary to do things the same way? Currently, policy-making processes
are more sophisticated and the trend points towards redefining the energy sector in relation to the
market, environment, and foreign issues.46 From an international point of view, instead, the meagre
Footnote continued
see especially, Karen Palmer, A. Paula, and M. Woerman, Federal Policies for Renewable Electricity (February 12, 2011)
Economics Climate Change (http://www.economicsclimatechange.com/2011/02/federal-policies-for-renewable.html).
39Historically, see L. Paris, G. Zini, M. Valtorta, G. Manzoni, A. Invernizzi, N. De Franco, A. Vian, Present Limits of very
Long Distance Transmission Systems (Paper presented at International Conference on Large High Voltage Electric Systems,
Paris, France, 29 August – 6 September, 1984) 8. For a current perspective see, specially, Michael Rodi (ed.), Energy
Infrastructure and Policy Options for a Sustainable Future (Lexxion, 2012).
40Ibid.
415 to 20mills/kWh.
42High voltage direct current (HVDC). As opposed to high voltage alternate current (HVAC). See Claverton Energy-
Research Group, HVDC (February 22, 2011) Claverton Energy (http://www.claverton-energy.com/tag/hvdc).
43It has been calculated that for transmitting 10GW the increase is c.1.5mills/kWh for each additional 1000 kms.
44Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or EURATOM Treaty), opened for signature March
25 1957, 298 UNTS 167 (entered into force January 1, 1958).
45For a good assessment on the theoretical costs and benefits of unbundling power grids and the models of
transmission ownership see Pollit, Michael, The arguments for and against ownership unbundling of energy transmission
networks (Ofgem, August 2007). The author concludes suggesting that evidence seems to be that ownership unbundling
of transmission is an essential part of successful energy market reforms. The author is part of the ESRC Electricity Policy
Research Group of the University of Cambridge.
46As still insufficient outcomes of such trend at transnational and international level see Regulation 714/2009/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of July 13 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border
exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 [2009] OJ L 211/15. See also Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT) and Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA) (Lisbon), opened for
signature December 17 1994, 33 ILM 360 (entered into force April 16 1998).
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interaction between states is channelled through the traditional rules of international cooperation,
mostly, bilateral.
Supranational decisions, in turn, requires more than that. The development of supranational
authorities and common policies points to the progressive appearance of common and overlapping
intergovernmental interests. Normally, at the international level, this process manifests itself through
the formation of coalitions focused on achieving a particular goal by means of concerted actions in the
sphere of common interest. Conversely and most of the time, the main cause of not having a common
policy in energy does not reside upon states and/or industry sectors lacking of overlapping interests,
but on legal obstacles such as discriminatory rules, outdated legal regimes, and lack of transparency.
The three conditions analysed above: technical and economic compatibility as well as a common
supranational interest-oriented policy, have enormous potential for driving up the legitimacy and
enforceability of international law, for they foster international power trade and renewables-based
sustainable economic development. The enhancement process works through exploiting the common
know-how on power transmission, thus levelling the technical ground for players; getting the most out
of the comparative advantage economic theory in practice, and building upon the interdependence
created by supranational interests articulated by policy harmonization processes.
Indeed, international law provides a framework of necessary minimal rules designed to lower levels
of uncertainty and mutual suspicion between states but, it also can encourage cooperation in
achieving common beneficial goals.47 However, this seems not enough to make transnational power
interconnections a reality. International law is an evolving normative system which provides a source of
mutual recognition and legitimacy of states’ decisions interacting with each other. The possibility of a
nation motu proprio limiting the exercise of its sovereign capacities in a confined area – for instance,
to allow foreign electricity en route to a third state flow through the local grid and across its territory
without legal appropriation nor interruption – being this status guaranteed to, and enforceable by
third parties, does not exist currently at the international realm.48
Cross-border transmission provides an opportunity for international law to achieve greater
acceptance and enforceability due to pursuing the attainment of a common beneficial goal, which
naturally favours consensus and mutual responsibility in cooperation frameworks. This is so because
cross-border grid interconnection is a well-defined technical matter which does not leave room for
political misinterpretations; the usual characterisation of the industry as monopolistic is no obstacle for
interconnection making sense economically. Considering the power status of the parties involved, their
energy policies configuration, current technical features and capabilities of power networks – even if
not straightforwardly expressed, its functionality can at any rate be construed as a long-term one
destined to deliver a continuing service, thus, making possible – if so required – to infer legal
obligations and responsibilities between stakeholders going beyond those of mere export/import
transactions.
A number of arguments can be advanced for international law enforceability to benefit from cross-
border interconnections. In the first place, cross-border grid interconnections is a well-defined
technical matter which per se, facilitates negotiation and reaching consensus. Second, interconnecting
grids cross-border makes economic sense even based solely upon the advantages of international
power-trading, all the more if potential energy policies synchronisation (or better still, harmonisation) is
considered. Thirdly, transmission systems’ usual characterization as monopolistic does not represent a
serious obstacle for states to get their facilities interconnected, provided adequate antitrust regulation
is put in place guaranteeing domestic access to power trunk-grids suitable both for international
interconnection and all kind of sources, particularly, renewables. Fourthly, energy dependency and
corresponding energy security policies constitute real incentive for grid interconnections and legal
mechanisms of enforcement.49 Finally, the possibility to link a single, technically-based, well-defined
scope (cross-border grid interconnection) to an already set-up and ongoing international law
47See generally, Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford Clarendon Press, 7th ed., 2008).
48In this sense, just consider the number of possibilities opened for international trade, development of financial
markets, globalized GHG abatement process, furtherance of renewable sources worldwide, and international law efficacy.
49An important development in sovereign states transferring some enforcement power to international organisations
and their secretariats is found in arts 162(2) (a), (u), (v), (w) and (z) and 176 of the 1982 UNCLOS. Through these provisions
the authority is endowed with legal personality and capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
fulfilment of its purposes. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, Montego Bay), opened for signature
December 10 1982, 21 ILM 1261 (entered into force November 16, 1994).
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framework (such as the WTO or an improved ECT-scheme) with due guarantees of non-discrimination,
full grid access, independent operation, and non-interrupted power flow, would contribute to
international law achieving greater enforceability, being the motivation for such a scheme fair
unrestricted power trade, energy security, and sustainable economic development, objectives shared
by all stakeholders of the international community.
III.3. Case study: European Union
For many observers, the European Union stands out as a model of integration and international
cooperation. In the following sections, a comprehensive overview of the EU’s electricity regulation is
provided. It starts by describing the overarching legal framework sustaining the EU’s relevant
institutions before focusing on energy and, finally, addressing the specific legal regulation of power
transmission. The focus is aimed at identifying legal tools useful for energy regulation which are
potentially applicable to foster grid interconnection and international power transit between countries
not engaged in integration processes.50
In analysing the European Union case study and the need for developing comprehensive legal
structures to facilitate power transit and guide prospective and independent operation of cross-border
power grids, the paper will address the interaction between international51 and supranational law,52 in
terms of the effect upon the traditional understanding of sovereignty.53 In a traditional view the
interplay between sovereignty and national territory on the one hand; and natural resources sited
within on the other, requires the national territory not to be transferred, leased, or alienated in any way
to a foreign entity. Over time, however, this somewhat harsh and mostly unrealistic view of national
sovereignty has been weakened by several factors including the pragmatism derived from trading
needs. Under pressure from transnational corporate action and international tender processes for
infrastructure projects, many states grant concessions for the exploration and exploitation of natural
resources, as well as allowing foreign private or public investment upon lands, which in effect means
that controls over property are being granted, particularly, by developing countries. This trend,
however, is also bringing about some consequences for the not-so-needy: the EU supranational legal
framework is being challenged by a reality for which it was not originally designed: the pressing need to
multilaterally integrate energy sources coming from outside its borders.
III.3.1. General legal framework
The EU is an international organization54 established by international treaties55 that impose mutual
rights and obligations upon its contracting states and limits their sovereign rights in specific matters.56
In effect, this transfers competences/powers to EU institutions over which the member states have
no direct control. This particular legal system is, therefore, ‘supranational’ in nature,57 for it constitutes
50See section V below, on comparative analysis of the Brazilian case study.
51For these purposes, the body of law composed of principles and rules of conduct which states feel themselves bound
to observe.
52Often defined as the law of supranational organisations or regional agreements, where a distinguishing feature is that
the domestic law of its member states are deemed inapplicable when conflicting with the supranational legal order in
which those states partake.
53In a traditional understanding of sovereignty, the power and control that a state exert over its territory is absolute and
does not allow exceptions. Under this view, sovereignty do not convey a flexible approach as to the inherent prerogatives
of the state, particularly, over territory control and jurisdiction. As a consequence, in this conventional light, for instance,
the idea of non-exclusive use of natural resources is unacceptable.
54Above n. 50.
55Treaty on European Union or Maastricht Treaty (EU Treaty), opened for signature February 7 1992, consolidated
version [2008] O.J. C115/1 (entered into force on November 1, 1993). The EU Treaty was amended by the Treaty of
Amsterdam, opened for signature October 2 1997 OJ C 340/1 (entered into force May 1, 1999); the Treaty of Nice amending
the TEU, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, opened for signature February 26
2001, [2001] O.J. C80/1 (entered into force February 1, 2003), and by the Lisbon Treaty or Treaty of the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU), opened for signature June 20, 2007 OJ C 306/1 (entered into force December 1 2009) art 4(1)-(2).
The consolidated version can be found retrieved in: Maastricht Treaty (EU Treaty), [2008] O.J. C115/1. See also, Treaty
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or EURATOM Treaty), opened for signature March 25 1957, 298
UNTS 167 (entered into force January 1, 1958).
56Van Gend&Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastigen (26/62) [1963] E.C.R. 1 at 12; [1963] C.M.L.R. 105.
57Although the term ‘supranational’– in use in art.9(5, 6) of the ECSC- was totally left out of the two Treaties of Rome by
the repealing of the said art.9 ECSC by the Merger Treaty and replaced with an identical text in the three European Treaties.
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the contracting states own common legal system though not being national law per se, namely,
different from any individual domestic jurisdiction ultimately derived from sovereign powers.
The ‘shared competences’ between the EU and the member states include energy issues,
trans-European networks, security, the internal market, and economic and territorial cohesion;58
policies relating to these areas are entrusted jointly to the EU and the member states. The Council
has been empowered, however, to ‘adopt broad guidelines of the economic policies of the member
states and the Union.’59 Nonetheless, since the EU – acting alone – has no competence to
implement what has been recommended, cooperation and flexible coordination between member
states are necessary.
III.3.2. European energy policy: internal market and infrastructure investment
This section analyses the current European energy policy and how appurtenant EU law deals with
energy markets in general and networks and security of supply, in particular.
The internal market of the EU is defined by the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free movements of goods, persons, services
and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.’60 We are concerned here,
only, with the goods-movement aspect of the internal market, since we acknowledge power as a
fungible commodity: a movable good61 which, in accordance to the EU law, can circulate freely, without
obstacles, across the territory enclosed by the external frontiers of the Union. This creates, in theory, a
single market for electricity.
The EU energy policy is embedded in the overarching European internal market policy. Creating a
competitive internal market for energy is one of the EU’s priority objectives. For this to occur, a reliable
and integrated energy network is required and, therefore, infrastructure investment. In line with this, the
Council Regulation (EU, EURATOM) 617/20101 of June 24th 2010 provides for a harmonised reporting
framework to the Commission of investment projects in energy infrastructure (of any kind) within the
European Union.62 This information enables the Commission to conduct analyses on the market and
prepare annual network development plans for electricity.63
When it comes to security of supply, each member state must designate a transmission system
operator for a certain period which is responsible for ensuring that the system’s transmission capacity
and reliability meet reasonable demands for power transmission. In this field, the EU has the Agency for
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) a body established in 2010 by Regulation (EC) 713/2009 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 with an overarching mission ‘to assist
national energy regulatory authorities (NRAs) to perform their duties at EU level and to coordinate their
actions.’64 These actions are focused on the development of common network and market rules
58Lisbon Treaty or Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), opened for signature June 20 2007 OJ C
306/1 (entered into force December 1 2009) art 4(1)-(2).
59Ibid [99] art 121(2)3.]
60Ibid [14(2)] art 26(2).
61See above n. 35, 37 on the character of electricity. Power’s mobility is a physic-based feature. Its legal characterization
as fungible or not is far more troublesome and poses several interesting questions. For instance, it can properly be said
that power is fungible in the context of each industry sector, for the power produced by any generator; conveyed by any
transmitter; and delivered by any distributor is or might be interchangeable. However, if one considers power outcome at
certain tension (say low voltage) undertaking step-up voltage transformation (to be transported long distances, for
example) could it be legally said that it is still the same interchangeable product? Similar legal question may arise after
step-down voltage transformation process undertaken. Furthermore, if economic characterization of ‘goods’ factors are got
into consideration, the outlook might get even more daunting, for as to economics is concerned, power (regardless of
voltage transformation) simply cannot be replaced by anything alike, economically, there is no substitute ‘good’ for
electricity. In the current state of exceptional interconnected power grids, states’ sovereign power-prone policies tend to
look at electric power as a tradeable good, a mere seasonal export commodity rather than as a long-term service of cross-
border electricity supply. See Puget Sound Energy, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co, 271 B.R. 626, 638-40 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
The argument of this paper aimed at putting on the spotlight the relevance of dedicated long-term power grid
interconnection and transit international agreements to change mainstream views whilst strengthening international law’s
legitimacy and enforceability in the specific area of regional cross-border electricity transmission.
62Council Regulation 617/20101/EU-EURATOM of June 24 2010 concerning the notification to the Commission of
investment projects in energy infrastructure within the European Union and repealing Regulation No 736/96/EC [2010]
OJ L 180/7.
63The Commission must forward this analysis to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and
Social Committee.
64Regulation 713/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 13 2009 establishing the Agency for
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) [2009] OJ L 211/1. See also Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER),
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and the coordination of regional initiatives to support the European power market integration.65
In doing so, ACER boasts a quite distinctive feature: it may allow third countries outside the EU to
participate therein.66
III.3.3. The energy policy: targeting 2020
The EU energy policy has evolved around the common objective of securing uninterrupted physical
availability of electricity in the market, at an affordable price, while contributing to the EU’s social and
climate goals.67 In November 2010, the Commission communicated its vision of a European energy
strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy: Energy 2020.68
The new energy strategy focuses on five priorities.69 First, energy efficiency as a key-factor for
long-term energy, climate goals, and member states’ decoupling energy use from economic growth.
Second, a truly pan-European integrated, interconnected, and competitive energy market. Third,
empowering consumers to exercise EU’s rights in regard to accessing the power services they need, as
well as to achieving the highest level of safety and energy security on the basis of sufficient
transmission and storage infrastructure. Fourth, energy technology development and innovation
leadership through cooperation at EU level. Fifth, strengthening the external dimension of the EU
energy market acting with third-country energy partners with a common voice, beyond mere national
initiatives, and formalising the principle whereby member states act in the benefit of the EU as a whole
in bilateral energy-related negotiations. A couple of years after its release, a critical assessment of what
have and have not worked in implementing this strategy varied. Positives counts in measures taken for
developing new energy technologies (e.g., plasma, nuclear fission projects having EU funding)70 and
those adopted for increasing energy efficiency.71 However, being intrinsically measures of a long-term
nature, they can hardly be attributed to any impact of the new strategy. In turn, the advance of the
‘power-to-consumers’ priority is arguably, particularly, as not being considered specific or fully
detached from the general process of consumers empowerment in other markets; and, if existent,
could well be considered modest. Rest examining the downsides of the model in practice and, to this
end, we shall look at priorities two and five in more detail next.
Footnote continued
‘Possibility of Neighbouring Countries and their Transmission System Operators to Participate in ACER and in the ENTSOs’
(Staff Working Paper No 546, SEC, April 28 2011).
65Council Directive 303/54 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [2003] O.J. L176/37. See also
A. Mathijsen, A Guide to European Union Law as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon 191, 208-209 (Sweet & Maxwell –
Thomson Reuters, 10th ed., 2010). See especially, Council Directive 2003/54/EC of June 26 2003 concerning common rules
for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC [2003] OJ L 176/37, 37-56; Regulation 714/2009/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of July 13 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border
exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 [2009] OJ L 211/15.
66Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators – ACER (http://www.acer.europa.eu).
67Article 194 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU). See also, Council Directive 2003/54/EC of
June 26 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC [2003] OJ L
176/37, 56.
68A worth noting legal mechanism being ‘joint support schemes’, whereby a certain amount of energy from renewable
sources produced in the territory of a member state may count towards the national overall target of another. See Directive
2009/28/EC including mandatory national targets for the overall share of energy from renewable sources in gross final
consumption by 2020. Being the first that (a) statistical transfer of specified amounts of energy from renewable sources
from one member state to another member state has been made in accordance with art 6; or (b) set up a distribution rule
agreed by participating member states that allocates amounts of energy from renewable sources between the participating
member states. This mechanisms is in force since 2011, thus, the impact of the Renewable Energy Directive is still a matter
to be assessed against conventional policy support schemes.
69European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Energy 2020 a strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure
energy COM 639 final (2010) Eur-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri¼CELEX:52010DC0639:EN:
HTML:NOT). See also Energy Community, The Energy Community. Legal framework (Energy Community Secretariat (ECS),
2nd ed., 2010), (available at www.energy-community.org).
70The Max Planck Institut für Plasmaphysik (Institute for Plasma Physics, IPP), for instance, is an institute of the Max
Planck Gesellschaft, part of the European Fusion Programme (EURATOM) and an associate member of the Helmholtz-
Gemeinschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren. The Institute has undertaken projects on Plasma Physics and Controlled
Fusion for several years in conjunction with the European Union. To that effect, a plasma vessel of Wendelstein 7-X is
currently under construction at the Institute’s facilities in Greifswald, Germany. The completion of the assembly of
Wendelstein 7-X is foreseen for 2014. IPP Annual Report 2011 (Druckerei Behr, Scheyern-Fernhag, 2011).
71The origin of such measures can be fairly dated back as far as the early 70s, just after the so-called ‘oil crisis’ that
causes a shocking acknowledgement of the European and USA oil-based energy dependency.
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III.3.4. The pan-European energy market and its external dimension
Here, the legal framework for international cooperation relevant to the transmission sector within the
EU will be considered. In most cases, the policy-making action of the European Council in the area is
determined by the submission of a proposal by the Commission, which conferred powers, therefore,
will be commented in connection with the strategy priorities mentioned above.
One of the Commission’s priority is to establish a pan-European integrated energy market and has
already taken concrete actions to that end. Its first action is, not surprisingly, regulatory in nature: to
efficiently and accurately implement the existing internal market legislation and to strengthen the
competition policy. The third Internal Energy Market Package created new tools of public policy,
including an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)72 and the new European
Networks of Transmission System Operators for Electricity and Gas (ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G) which
should play a major role in finally integrating energy markets. Regional initiatives such as the
Baltic Energy Market and the Mediterranean Ring should also serve as building blocks of a European
energy market.73
The second action is establishing the strategic infrastructure priorities needed for 2020–2030.
Accordingly, the Commission is preparing a communication aimed at identifying what is required for a
functioning internal market, integration of renewable sources, and security of supply as well as a set of
policy instruments to implement them in the next two decades. By the same token, ENTSO-E and
ENTSO-G have been entrusted by the Commission to develop the blueprint of European Electricity and
Gas grids. The target is getting all member states interconnected through cross-border corridors by
2015 whilst taking into account network connections with third countries on the basis of the energy
2050 roadmap, released in 2011.
The third action of the Commission is reforming and improving permit procedures and rules for grid
infrastructure projects of ‘European interest’. The method for defining ‘strategic infrastructure’ or
‘European interest’ will prove to be essential in terms of energy selection, sustainability, access, and
secure competitive supply.
On September 7th 2011, the Commission released the communication entitled ‘The EU Energy Policy:
Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders’ which addresses security of the energy supply and
international cooperation.74 This document furthers and strengthens an idea embodied in the Energy
Strategy 2020: that of the EU having, effectively, a common voice as to external energy policy. To this
effect, the Union sets up four specific priorities.
The first priority is to create an external dimension of the energy market, in other words, one
reflecting the interconnectedness and transparency of the internal market beyond its boundaries. This
works as an express recognition of the interdependence between member states which is seen as the
best option of the Union to face the challenges of ever-increasing energy costs and energy supply
disruptions. The EU attempts to build up the external dimension by also revitalizing the principle of
solidarity among member states and, in accordance to it, configuring a regular information-exchange
on intergovernmental energy-related agreements planned and entered into member states and third
countries. As seen, bilateral agreements with third countries impact the carrying-out of infrastructure
projects and energy supply to the Union. Apart from abiding in full by EU legislation, particularly
notification procedures, the negotiation and conclusion of these agreements are subjected to
structured forms to exchange information at EU level, which might represent a new erosion of
traditional views of state sovereignty.
A further priority is to strengthen partnerships with key energy suppliers for secure, safe, sustainable,
and competitive energy. In this context, the Union must deal comprehensively with Russia75 and other
72Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), ‘Possibility of Neighbouring Countries and their Transmission
System Operators to Participate in ACER and in the ENTSOs’ (Staff Working Paper No 546, SEC, 28 April 2011), See
Regulation 713/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 13 2009 establishing an Agency for
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators [2009] OJ L 211/1. See also Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators – ACER
(http://www.acer.europa.eu).
73European Commission at (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/bemip_en.htm).
74European Commission, Communication on security of energy supply and international cooperation – The EU Energy
Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders COM 539 final (September 7, 2011) Europe (http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/international/security_of_supply/doc/com_2011_0539.pdf).
75EU-Directorate for Energy, Common Understanding on the preparation of the Roadmap of the EU-Russia Energy
Cooperation until 2050 between the coordinators of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, the European Commissioner for
Energy and the Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation (February 24 2011) EC-Europe (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/
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hydrocarbon-exporting countries such as Algeria, Qatar, Australia, and OPEC countries which provide
natural gas and crude-oil. It is important, also, the long-standing interaction with Norway through the
European Economic Area and the EU-Norway Energy Dialogue. The EU’s carbon-abatement targets
require, however, new sorts of partnerships involving reliable supply of renewable energy from
countries like Brazil and the USA in regard to biofuels. This goal is of utmost importance for the EU,
particularly, after the winter of 2009 who witnessed serious gas transit disputes between Russia and
Ukraine, ultimately resulting in cut-offs of Russian gas supply destined to Europe traversing Ukraine’s
territory. As it shall be seen,76 in this area, the EU encourages the participation of major suppliers in the
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) framework, something in which has clearly failed.77
A third priority is to improve access to sustainable energy for developing countries. Here, the Union
relies on achieving the Millennium Development Goals and the EU-Africa 2020 energy targets to
promote inclusive growth, eradicate poverty, achieve reliable supply of energy and increased access
to energy services. In the view of the Union, energy is a key driver of sustainable development.
Accordingly, energy access is one of the main challenges for it. In close connection, efforts revolve
around making the energy markets more stable, since oil-price fluctuations have substantial impacts
on developing economies.
The final priority is to better promote EU policies beyond its borders by using a strategic approach
involving flexibility in scope, different sorts of legal relationships entertained with EU partners, and
legal instruments tailored for each country or organisation. In this sense, the Union has clearly set forth
that amongst member states (market integration relationship) and in the relationships between the
Union, its key energy suppliers and transit countries (consumer/supplier relationship), common
instruments to be used to deal with EU energy policy and issues of common interest (such as security
of supply/demand) will be those under the European Neighbourhood Policy, crisis-response
instruments, and/or specific partnership, cooperation, and trade agreements on energy, particularly,
the ECT. In line with these decisions, the EU is committed to improve the coordination among member
states in relevant fora such as the International Energy Agency (IEA),78 the International Energy Forum
(IEF), the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC), and the International
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), in which unity of interests and cooperation among member states
should prevail in the conduct of negotiations.
As a way of optimising the EU’s external assistance in the sector, the Union seeks to promote the
alignment of international financial institutions’ instruments with EU external energy policy priorities in
order to improve visibility and impact of EU’s policies in non-EU countries. The proposed creation of a
database on EU and member states’ energy projects in third countries is another important follow-up
action. Of course these actions can be read under a more critical light and reinterpreted as efforts to
Footnote continued
publications/doc/2011_eu-russia_energy_relations.pdf). See also EU-Directorate for Energy, Progress Report on the
Roadmap of the EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050 (29 July 2011) EC-Europe (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/internati
onal/russia/doc/20110729_eu_russia_roadmap_2050_report.pdf).
76See section IV.2 below.
77For a detailed analysis of the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute and implications as to the Energy Charter Treaty, see
Anna Marhold, Is there Light at the End of the Gas Pipe? – Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty to the 2009
Russia-Ukraine Gas Dispute in Rodi, Michael, Energy Infrastructure and Policy Options for a Sustainable Future (Lexxion,
Berlin, 2012) 127. See also EU-Directorate for Energy, Common Understanding on the preparation of the Roadmap of the
EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050 between the coordinators of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, the European
Commissioner for Energy and the Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation (February 24 2011) EC-Europe (http://ec.
europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2011_eu-russia_energy_relations.pdf). See also, EU-Directorate for Energy, Progress
Report on the Roadmap of the EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050 (July 29 2011) EC-Europe (http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/international/russia/doc/20110729_eu_russia_roadmap_2050_report.pdf). See also The Independent,
Dependence on Russian energy places Europe at risk (2009), The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/
editorials/leading-article-dependence-on-russian-energy-places-europe-at-risk-1229945.html); Cameron, Fraser The
Politics of EU-Russia Energy Relations (EU-Russia Centre, 2010) at (http://scholar.google.cl/scholar?
q¼EUþenergyþdependenceþ fromþRussiaþ fraserþcameronþ&btnG¼&hl¼es&as_sdt¼0&as_vis¼1); Aalto, Pami
and Korkmaz Temel, Dicle, European/Eurasia Energy Security: From Vulnerability to Viability and Sustainability in Global
and Regional Problems. Towards an Interdisciplinary Studio (Aalto, Pami, Harle, Vilho and Moisio Sami (eds.), Ashgate
Publishing Limited, 2012) The International Political Economy of New Regionalism Series, ch 4 p 79. On the question about
the provisional application of the ECT in the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute of 2009, see Hulley Enterprises Limited v. the
Russian Federation (PCA Case No AA226), Yukos Universal Limited v. the Russian Federation (PCA Case No AA227) and
Veteran Petroleum Limited v. the Russian Federation (PCA Case No AA228), Interim Awards on Jurisdiction and Admisibility,
November 30 2009 available in the Energy Charter Treaty’s website at (www.encharter.org). See also n. 32 above.
78International Energy Agency (www.iea.org).
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control the financing of energy projects in third countries, from institutions such as the European
Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), other
European development banks, and even the World Bank (WB), providing financing a way to make
them align with EU energy policy interests.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The EU’s desire to expand its energy policy external dimension would not have much support if a net of
intertwined international cooperation schemes and instruments relevant to the energy sector had not
already existed, such as the WTO and ECT amongst those multilateral. An environment in which the EU
can not only deploy its co-ordinated and external common energy strategy79 trying to influence other
bodies’ goals and actions, but also to interact with other countries or groups, most of the time pursuing
opposite interests. A pan-European energy market is seen for many outside-onlookers as a mere revival
of a long-despised anti-competitive strategy.
The EU’s current international instruments can be classified in two categories: political and legal
instruments. The distinction is relevant because the EU’s international cooperation legal framework
comprises the Energy Community, the Energy Charter Treaty,80 and the WTO;81 and the scope of this
paper deals only with the two former, subject-specific, international regulatory frameworks in what
concerns Europe.82
IV.1. The European Energy Community
The international treaty establishing the European Energy Community (EEC) was signed in Athens on
October 25th 2005 and entered into force on July 1st 2006. The contracting parties are the EU on the one
hand and a number of third countries on the other.83 All of them determined to establish among
themselves an energy community84 with a stable market and regulatory framework capable of
attracting investment in gas, power generation, and transmission networks,85 and enabling all parties
to have access to continuous energy supply.
Acknowledging the importance of security of energy supply to economic development and social
stability, the Energy Community is mostly about extending the internal gas and electricity market
towards South-East Europe through energy investments. In fact, the scope of the EEC deals much with
the EU directives on security of electricity and gas supply towards which the acquis communautaire
79As proposed in European Commission, above n. 47.
80The current EU framework also comprises the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the ITER Agreement which deal with
nuclear weapons and a multilateral scientific project involving the EU, U.S., India, China, South Korea, Russia, and Japan to
demonstrate the feasibility of fusion as energy source, respectively. The EU, acting on the basis of the Treaty establishing
the European Atomic Energy Community, confirmed ITER Agreement’s adoption to the International Atomic Energy
Authority (IAEA) on February 5, 2007. Since both agreements cover atomic issues they are out of the scope of this research.
Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International Fusion Energy Organization for the Joint Implementation of the
ITER Project (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor – ITER), signed on November 21 2006 (entered into force
October 24, 2007).
81As such, the WTO framework largely exceeds the material scope of this paper, thus, it shall not be analysed except
for what concerns to international trade law mechanisms used to secure energy supply by reference of the Energy
Charter Treaty.
82In this sense, current political tools as Energy Dialogues, Memoranda of Understanding, Partnership Action Plans or
Roadmaps, Association Agendas, or other similar political instruments are not considered.
83Original signatories were Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, the Republic of Montenegro, Serbia, Romania, Turkey and Kosovo represented by United Nations Mission
Interim in Kosovo (UNMIK) under UNSC Res 1244. Later, in 2010, it was signed by Moldova and Ukraine this latter with effect
as of February 2011. Neighbouring third countries interested into and having observer status according to the treaty are
Norway, Georgia, and Turkey. Lately, Armenia has applied for observer status, which is worthy to note since it is a country
falling outside of the European neighbourhood policy area.
84Treaty establishing the Energy Community (also known as EEC and ECSEE), opened for signature October 25 2005,
OJ L 198, 18–37 (entered into force July 1 2006), art 1(1).
85The European Energy Community defines ‘network energy’ in art 2(2) as including the gas and electricity sectors
falling within the scope of the European Community Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC. See Council Directive
2003/54/EC of June 26 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive
96/92/EC [2003] OJ L 176/37, 37-56; Council Directive 2003/55/EC of June 26 2003 concerning common rules for the
internal market in natural gas repealing Directive 98/30/EC [2003] OJ L 176/57, 57; Regulation 1775/2005/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of September 28 2005 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission
networks [2005] OJ L 289/1, 1-13; Council Directive 2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas
supply [2003] OJ L 176/57, 57-78.
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was extended in 2007, the EU legislation on energy efficiency,86 selected Directives on environmental
protection, competition, and state-aid rules.
For these objectives to be achieved, one of the instruments of the treaty is the implementation of key
parts of the EU law into the territories of non-EU participating countries. Indeed, by joining the EEC, the
contracting parties commit themselves to implement relevant EU rules on energy, environment, and
competition within specific timeframes. In this fashion, the EEC purports to create a common regulatory
framework for gas and electricity markets via extending the EU law. Title II of the treaty addresses the
legally-binding commitment to extend energy-related core parts of the acquis communautaire to non-
EU contracting parties. In regard to electricity,87 the parties have agreed on transposing the common
rules for the internal market,88 the rules on conditions for access to the network for cross-border
exchanges in electricity,89 those dealing with the management and allocation of available transfer
capacity of interconnections between nationals,90 and the rules promoting power generation from
renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market, among others.91 The timeline set up
to achieve the entire liberalisation of the electricity market in the common area is to expire by
January, 2015.
Title III is of particular relevance for it contains ‘provisions on creating mechanisms for long-distance
transportation of Network Energy’92 as well as for providing safeguard-measures in crisis events. Article
28 sets forth that the EEC ‘shall take additional Measures establishing a single mechanism for the
cross-border transmission and/or transportation of Network Energy’.93 However, for the greater part,
the provisions in Title II and III call for implementation through actions to be taken either by the parties
or by energy community bodies. The main bodies established are the Ministerial Council, the
Permanent High Level Group, the Energy Community Regulatory Board (ECRB), the Fora, and the
Secretariat.
According to Title VII provisions, the implementation of decisions addressed to the parties in their
domestic legal systems shall be performed within the period specified in the decision.94 Failure by a
party to comply with it may be brought to the attention of the Ministerial Council by a reasoned request
of any party, the Secretariat or the Regulatory Board. It is also possible for private bodies to approach
86This includes, particularly, directives on buildings’ energy performance, energy labelling, and energy services, which
according to the ECC-Treaty must be implemented in general by late 2011. However, the contracting parties have also
agreed to implement parts of Council Directive 2009/28/EC of April 23 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from
renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (the ‘Third
Package’ on the internal market in electricity and gas) [2009] OJ L 140/16 on a voluntary basis.
87The ECC-Treaty makes explicit, as well, the core parts of the acquis on gas, environment, competition, and energy
efficiency that must be implemented by the contracting parties. On gas, for instance, the following Directives must be
transposed to national realms: Council Directive 2003/55/EC of June 26 2003 concerning common rules for the internal
market in natural gas repealing Directive 98/30/EC [2003] OJ L 176/57, 57. As to environment, Council Directive 85/337/EEC
of June 27 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [1985] OJ L
175/40, 40-48; Council Directive 97/11/EC of March 3 1997 amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the
effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [1997] OJ L 073/5; Council Directive 2003/35/EC providing
for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and
amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC [2003] OJ
L 156/17, 17-24; Council Directive 2001/80/EC of October 23 2001 on the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into
the air from large combustion plants [2001] OJ L 309/1; Council Directive 1999/32/EC of April 26 1999 relating to a
reduction in the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels and amending Directive 93/12/EEC [1999] OJ L 121/13, 13-18; Council
Directive 79/409/EEC of April 25 1979 on the conservation of wild birds [1979] OJ L 103/1, 1-18 must be implemented. In
regard to competition, essential rules are arts 81, 82, 86(1)-(2), and 87 of the EC Treaty prohibiting cartels and abuse of
dominant positions the two former, respectively; making applicable EC’s rules on public undertakings and undertakings to
which special or exclusive rights have been granted; and prohibiting state-aids, the latter.
88Council Directive 2003/54/EC of June 26 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and
repealing Directive 96/92/EC [2003] OJ L 176/37, 37-56.
89Ibid.
90European Commission Decision 2006/770/EC of November 9 2006 amending the Annex to Regulation (EC) No
1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity (guidelines on the
management and allocation of available transfer capacity of interconnections) [2006] OJ L 312/59. See also Regulation
1228/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for
cross-border exchanges in electricity [2003] OJ L 176/1.
91Council Directive 2001/77/EC of September 27 2001on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy
sources in the internal electricity market [2001] OJ L 283/33.
92Energy-Community, About the Treaty (2011) Energy-Community (http://www.energy-community.org).
93Ibid.
94Treaty establishing the Energy Community (also known as EEC and ECSEE) (Athens), opened for signature October 25
2005, OJ L 198, 18–37 (entered into force July 1 2006), art 89.
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the Secretariat with complaints.95 The party concerned has a right to response to any complaint
or request that arises.96 According to different quora, it is a matter of the Ministerial Council’s
competence to determine the existence of a breach of a treaty obligation: by simple majority if it relates
to Title II or by two-thirds if concerns Title III.97 Serious and persistent breaches by a party to its
obligations might cause certain treaty rights to be suspended, if so determined by the Ministerial
Council by unanimity.98
The final objective of the EEC is to attract investment in power generation and networks in order
to ensure stable and continuous energy supply, create an integrated energy market allowing for
cross-border energy trade and, linked to the EU power market, enhance the security of energy whilst
improving the regional environmental situation.
IV.2 The Energy Charter Treaty
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related
Environmental Aspects (PEEREA) were signed in Lisbon, in December of 1994 and entered into
force in April of 1998. The ECT is a multilateral international treaty concerning energy investments
and trade. Up to date, the treaty has been signed or acceded to by fifty-one states, the EU and
EURATOM.99
From the organisational point of view, the Energy Charter Treaty sets up the conference as an
inter-governmental decision-making body. The conference has created several subsidiary bodies under
the form of working groups and committees which report to it and deal with particular issues such as
the strategy, investment, trade and transit, and protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental
aspects (PEEREA) groups as well as the budget and legal advisory committees. We are concerned here
with the tasks of one of these bodies: the Trade and Transit Group, because it assists and monitors
treaty rules’ implementation process on the said area and considers ways to facilitate energy flows
across the ECT constituency.
Apart from those on investments in infrastructure and power production,100 the ECT sets forth a much
more innovative body of rules covering trade and cross-border energy flows, namely, the way in which
energy-products can be transported across multiple domestic jurisdictions to reach international
markets. Its scope, however, is limited to the transit of energy products through fixed infrastructure.
The ECT relies on the WTO general rules in regard to power trading, applying them by reference for
trade between ECT members as well as between those contracting parties who have not yet acceded to
the WTO. However, in certain areas such as tariffs, services, and trade-related intellectual property
rights, the ECT’s scope is more restricted and appurtenant WTO’s rules do not apply. In regard to
the strategic issue of energy transit, ECT provisions oblige contracting parties to adopt measures to
facilitate power-flow in line with the principles of freedom of transit and no-discrimination. Moreover,
it compels transit-countries not to interrupt or obstacle current power flow, even in the presence of
disputes concerning the transit.
The basic rule on transit is set forth by Article 7(1) according to which:
Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary measures to facilitate the Transit of Energy
Materials and Products consistent with the principle of freedom of transit and without
distinction as to the origin, destination or ownership of such Energy Materials and Products or
discrimination as to pricing on the basis of such distinctions, and without imposing any
unreasonable delays, restrictions or charges.
For the purposes of that article, ‘transit’ is defined in a twofold manner: in Article 7(10)(a)(i) as ‘the
carriage through the Area of a Contracting Party, or to or from port facilities in its Area . . . of Energy




98Ibid art 92(1). The vote of the representative of the party concerned is, naturally, not taken into account for this
purpose, art 93.
99The current number of contracting parties is, to date, fifty-three. It is pertinent to note here, however, that Russia
signed the ECT Treaty and though was applying it provisionally until October 18 2009 inclusive; it has not ratified it yet.
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA),
opened for signature December 17 1994, 33 ILM 360 (entered into force April 16 1998).
100As for energy-related investments it is noteworthy, however, that the treaty contains a set of rules capable to be
enforced through a dispute settlement system.
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state, so long as either the other state or the third state is a Contracting Party; or’101 under Article
7(10)(a)(ii) ‘the carriage through the Area of a Contracting Party of [said items] originating in the Area of
another Contracting Party and destined for the Area of that other Contracting Party . . . ’, being this latter
the default situation.
However, contrary to rules concerning investments – when failure to comply might trigger
international arbitration – material rules concerning energy transit are supposed to be enforced
through a distinctive bilateral dispute settlement mechanism.102 This special mechanism to address
potential power-transit disputes, though understandable in the light of multiple cross-border transit
requiring the consent of several sovereign states, may also be deemed as the fundamental flaw of a
system purportedly designed to secure unrestricted flow of energy-outputs. Indeed, there is a strong
conviction among contracting parties – particularly, the EU – that the ECT’s provisions on transit
ought to be enhanced in order to develop a more robust operative framework capable of securing
transit flow of energy resources in situations where transboundary crossing takes place at least
between three countries.
Indeed, market coupling103 attempts in regional power markets are being conducted between
the Central Western European and Nordic regions and Great Britain. Here, the starting point is an
interconnection: the BritNed cable,104 a submarine transmission line which connects Great Britain
(Isle of Grain) with the Netherlands (Maasvlakte). The market coupling mechanism was jointly
developed by power exchanges (PEXs) and transmission systems operators (STOs), and operates
on the basis of running day-ahead auctions daily in the linked set of markets where members
submit anonymous firm orders which are matched to power offers on the basis of available
transmission capacity and economic welfare criterion. This determines the optimal power flow
from low-price areas into areas of higher prices. In this fashion, the isolated British power market
is connected with the Dutch power market and, through this, on the one hand with the wider
Central Western European market in which the Dutch market partakes; and, on the other, with
the Nordic European regions, since the Dutch market is also interconnected to Norway through the
NorNed interconnector.
101The exception would be set forth in 4. Annex N which list Canada and the United States of America as contracting
parties requiring at least three separate areas to be involved in ‘transit’ in accordance with art 7(10)(a) of the Energy Charter
Treaty. However, both countries have not yet signed the ECT. Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and Energy Charter Protocol on
Energy Efficiency and related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA), opened for signature December 17 1994, 33 ILM 360
(entered into force April 16 1998).
102Ibid. ECT Article 7(6) states:
A Contracting Party through whose Area Energy Materials and Products transit shall not, in the event of a
dispute over any matter arising from that Transit, interrupt or reduce, permit any entity subject to its control
to interrupt or reduce, or require any entity subject to its jurisdiction to interrupt or reduce the existing flow
of Energy materials and Products prior to the conclusion of the dispute resolution procedures set out in
paragraph (7), except where this is specifically provided for in a contract or other agreement governing such
Transit or permitted in accordance with the conciliators’ decision.
ECT Article 7(7), in turn, sets forth provisions applicable to disputes described in paragraph (6) only after exhaustion of ‘all
relevant contractual or other dispute resolution remedies’. Only then, resort is given to the conciliation paragraphs (a) to (f)
of the Article. According to them, the claimant contracting party may refer the dispute to the Secretary-General of the ECT.
This, in consultation with the parties to the dispute and other contracting parties concerned, shall appoint a conciliator. The
conciliator shall seek the agreement of the parties to the dispute to a resolution thereof or upon a procedure to achieve
such resolution within 90 days of his/her appointment. If the conciliator does not succeed within that time in securing such
agreement, he/she shall recommend a resolution to the dispute or a procedure to achieve such resolution and ‘shall
decide the interim tariffs and other terms and conditions to be observed for Transit from a date which he shall specify until
the dispute is resolved’. The parties to the dispute must observe the interim decisions set forth by the conciliator for twelve
months, unless a solution is found earlier.
103In 2005, the European Commission first mentioned power regional markets as a step towards a single European
power market. On January 2007, the Commission launched a package pointing at a common energy policy emphasizing
the need for a more transparent and competitive European power market. Since then, regional projects started amongst
them: the Central Western European (CWE) and the European Market Coupling Company (EMCC). The EMCC’s so-called
‘tight volume coupling’ project initiated the Nordic-German market coupling on November, 2009 by steps: the first one,
involving interconnectors Denmark-Germany (in 2008-2009) and Germany-Sweden (in May 2010, using the Baltic cable);
the second step, initiated in January 2010 aimed at creating a system integrating CWE price coupling and Nordic market
splitting (this time, the mechanism deployed was the so-called ‘Interim Tight Volume Coupling’); finally, since November
2010, the EMCC is undertaking the interconnection between Norway and the Netherlands through the NorNed cable.
It represents the world’s largest single power market of 1,816 TWh, about 60 per cent of European power consumption.
104BritNed is a 260 km long 1,000 MW high voltage direct current (HVDC) line owned by a joint venture formed by two
transmission companies: British (British National Grid) and Dutch (Dutch TenneT).
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Such inter-state trading platform design presents an opportunity for actually making a contrast
between experiences on the ground running ahead of fully developed regulatory solutions and,
therefore, potentially leading to transit-related controversies. As early as 2000, the ECT’s contracting
parties initiated formal negotiations aimed at elaborating a transit protocol. Twelve years later, this
protocol remains under discussion and, instead, the parties resort to either embedded legal
principles or other non-legal mechanisms in order to deal with transit disputes.
The role of international law principles
Three principles of international law contribute to shape up a legal framework on energy: international
cooperation, non-discrimination, and liberalization of trade.
The principle of international cooperation is paramount and underlies most of the ECT Treaty
provisions, particularly, those relating to energy transit and competition. The treaty obliges the
contracting parties to encourage cooperation in developing, modernizing, and operating energy
transport facilities serving areas of more than one contracting party, thus, mitigating the effects of
supply interruptions whilst facilitating interconnections of energy transport facilities.105 As to
competition, the ECT encourages consultation and information-exchange processes among
contracting parties as means for mutual assistance when enforcing competition rules.106
The principle of non-discrimination imposes a domestic regulatory duty on contracting parties not to
discriminate or treat less favorably energy materials and/or products in transit in connection with the
domestic provisions relating to energy transport and use of transport facilities, unless an existing
international agreement provides otherwise.107 This, in essence, is a conventional positive application
to energy matters of the well-known WTO ‘most favoured nation’ clause. The same provision also
contains a negative formulation of the principle where energy infrastructure proves itself insufficient. In
this scenario, contracting parties are compelled not to establish obstacles to new transport capacity
being established.108
A third principle informing the ECT framework is that of liberalization of international trade. This
brings the ECT’s provisions in line with WTO rules which hold that a process of progressive trade
liberalization is essential to achieve competitive markets. The contracting parties are expected to
mitigate any possible market distortion and eliminate barriers to competition in the energy sector.109
On the one hand, each contracting party is obliged to have and enforce an appropriate regulatory
framework capable of dealing with both unilateral and joint anti-competitive conducts in the relevant
market.110 Any contracting party may request appropriate enforcement action of the competition rules
of other contracting parties, if it believes that an anti-competitive conduct has been carried out in the
territory of the requested state which ‘adversely affect[s] an important interest relevant to the
purposes identified in . . . ’ Article 6 of the treaty, which is the one dealing with competition.111 The
provision sets forth a procedure for notification and exchange of information on the alleged
anti-competitive conduct, assessment on the part of the notified contracting party (or its competent
authorities), and a decision on the issue of initiating enforcement actions (or any relevant interim
development).112 The procedure alluded to, along with that for the settlement of disputes between
contracting parties provided for in Article 27(1) ECT, namely, diplomatic channels, are the sole means
105Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and related Environmental Aspects
(PEEREA), opened for signature December 17 1994, 33 ILM 360 (entered into force April 16 1998), art 7(2).
106Ibid art 6(4). See for instance European commission, COM/39.316, Gas de France (December 3 2009) 37 et seq,
COMP/M.2684, EnBW/EDP?Cajastur/Hidrocantábrico (March 19, 2002) 33 et seq, COMP/M.2432, Grupo Villar
Mir/EnBW/Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico (September 26, 2001) 67, VABA/VIAG, OJ 2001 L 188/1 (June 13, 2000) 224. See
also Regulation (EC) No 714 of the European Parliament and of the Council (July 13, 2009) on conditions for access to the
network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, OJ 2009 L 211/15. A good
contrasting analysis on competition rules applied to the area can be found in Quick, David M and Carey, James M,
Transmission capacity and market power: the Effect on a Dominant Generation Firm, 30 Energy Policy 699 et sEquation
(2002) and Borenstein, Severin, Bushnell, James and Stoft, Steven, The Competitive Effects of transmission capacity in a
Deregulated Electricity Industry, 31 RAND Journal of Economics, 294 et seq, 305 (2000),
107Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and related Environmental Aspects
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established in the ECT for resolving disputes with regard to the implementation or interpretation of
Article 6.113
This enquiry is concerned with the operational phase of a transmission line carrying power across
borders of several contracting parties, therefore, it is necessary to consider what happens when things
go wrong, which is typically the case of unilateral power supply interruptions, reversions of flow and
others alike involving at least three parties and generally known as transit disputes. Under Article 7(1),
contracting parties are compelled to act ‘to facilitate the Transit of Energy Materials and Products’.114
Not to do so, not to take ‘necessary measures’ in pursuing that could amount to a breach of the
treaty. As we shall see, the international legal solution proposed by the ECT to this core problem is,
however, substantively disappointing, for it ultimately relies upon the conciliation paragraphs (a) to (f)
of Article 7 ECT viable only after total exhaustion of ‘all relevant contractual or other dispute
resolution remedies’.115
Article 27 ECT provides for a dispute settlement mechanism applicable to this hypothesis in the
alternative. According to it, contracting parties in dispute should first resort to diplomatic negotiation in
settling the matter within a reasonable period of time. Otherwise, resort to submitting the matter to an
ad hoc tribunal is possible. The Charter provides for the establishment of the tribunal, which consists of
a panel of three judges. Default governing rules are UNCITRAL’s.116 The arbitral award must solve the
dispute according to the ‘Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law’117 and is to be
‘final and binding upon the Contracting Parties to the dispute’.118 However, unless otherwise agreed
upon by the contracting parties in dispute, the mechanism at stake does not apply to trade-related
investment measures119 or to energy materials and product-related trade between contracting parties
while any of them is not a party to the GATT or other relevant GATT-related instrument governing
the matter.120
Finally, as other platform-treaties do in pursuing their objectives and furthering their principles, the
ECT permits the negotiation of association agreements with states, regional economic integration
organizations or other international organizations.121
113Ibid art 6(7). ECT Article 27 provides for the settlement of disputes between contracting parties. Article 27(1) sets forth
that ‘Contracting parties shall endeavour to settle disputes concerning the application or interpretation of this Treaty
through diplomatic channels’. Paragraph (2) of the said Article, in turn, states that:
[i]f a dispute has not been settled in accordance with paragraph (1) within a reasonable period of time,
either party thereto may, except as otherwise provided in this Treaty or agreed in writing by Contracting
parties, and except as concerns the application or interpretation of Article 6 [emphasis added] or Article 19
or, for Contracting parties listed in Annex IA, the last sentence of Article 10(1), upon written notice to the
other party to the dispute submit the matter to an ad hoc [arbitral] tribunal under this Article.
In another way, under the ECT, a competition dispute based on the application or interpretation of Article 6 ECT might only
be resolved using either the ad hoc mechanism set forth in Article 6 or through that of Article 27(1). Unless reaching
agreement in writing on the contrary, Article 27(2) bans Arbitral Tribunals for solving the matter. Transit disputes under
Article 7 which may not be limited as to applicable treaty mechanisms of Article 27, face, however, different challenges in
connection with treaty’s general applicability, as is the case of state energy suppliers not ratifying it (such as the Russian
Federation) or making express reservations that hinder dispute settlement provisions.
114Ibid Annex 1, EM Energy Materials and Products (in accordance with Article 1(4)), 27.16 lists in ‘Electrical Energy’.
115Ibid art 7(7). See also n. 103 above.
116See above n. 35, 37, 62.
117Above n. 102, art 27(3)(g). Ibid on the question of whether or not electric power is a fungible or an intangible
commodity.
118Ibid art 27(3)(h).
119Ibid, concerning art 5.
120Art 29 of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) contains interim provisions on trade-related matters applicable to trade in
energy materials and products, precisely, while any contracting party is not a party to the GATT and related instruments. It
is worth noting that art 29(4) ECT contains GATT mimic rules limiting the taxation capacity of a contracting party when
importing/exporting energy materials and products when a contracting party is not a party to the GATT. In accordance
thereto, contracting parties shall endeavour not to increase tariff rates or other charge levied above the levels set forth in
appurtenant GATT Schedules. Notwithstanding this rule seems to be useful in terms of trade-related conditions, a critical
analysis reveals its true character as a mere consequential provision on potential tax-related issues, thus not addressing a
previous sine qua non subject matter which is the focus of this thesis, namely, getting power grids interconnected and
securing unrestricted power transit.
121Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and related Environmental Aspects
(PEEREA), opened for signature December 17 1994, 33 ILM 360 (entered into force April 16, 1998), art 43.
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IV.3. International standards and grid codes: A case study of universal cooperation
In order to set up the market coupling by 2014, a clear policy and common standards are needed in
advance to ensure interoperability across the network.122 For the EU, smart-meters and power grids are
vital to the ‘full exploitation of the potential for renewable energy and energy savings as well as
improvements in energy services’.123 A detailed action-programme is to be prepared to assist member
states in rolling-out smart-metering, information to consumers, and new available services. In this
predicament, ACER must ensure the standardisation of all necessary technical issues linked to access
to renewable sources and cross-border grid interconnection. In the latter context, ‘international
standards’ – sometimes referred to as the ‘universal system’ – are the technical foundations for
trans-boundary systems.
International standards for electronic and related technologies are developed in accordance with
Annex 3: Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards of the WTO
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which accepting standardization bodies – either
national or international – must abide thereby. One of the global organizations that prepares and
publishes international standards for all electric-related technologies, including transmission, and
carries out assessment of conformity to those standards is the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC). Indeed, one of the IEC’s Technical Committees – TC90 – is currently working to
define terms and a measuring method for superconducting wires; while TC20 has been in charge of
similar tasks in regard to insulated electrical power and control cables, accessories, and cable systems
for use in transmission.
Following, an example: transformers, an essential component of any interconnected transmission
system, allow voltage homogenization of alternating electric currents produced by different generating
units – either conventional or based on renewable sources of energies – which might be located in
different states. In regard thereto, international efforts for standardization and appurtenant assessment
systems play a critical role, firstly, because international standards not only improve industrial
efficiency (economies of design, better production, product quality and delivery), but also even most
importantly they facilitate interconnection and inter-operability of grids. Further, they allow electricity,
electrical devices or any component produced by a given country under international standards, to be
introduced, marketed, and sold in countries with different electrical systems, thus, preventing any
technical barrier or unnecessary obstacle for trading them across borders.
In the context of the European Energy Community, for instance, Title II of the EEC Treaty requires the
parties to bring their energy sectors in line with generally applicable standards of the EU.
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: BRAZIL
Brazil has been chosen as case-study of for a number of reasons. Firstly, Brazil has not only one
of the largest single state-owned transmission networks, but also one of the largest grid
expansion-rates in the world.124 However, its international nodes are relatively few, and all of
them relate to joint undertakings with neighbouring countries.125 Secondly, Brazil currently faces a
122The European Commission has set up a smart grid task force to discuss the implementation of smart grids at the
European level. European Union, Task Force on SmartGrids (2011) Europe (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/sm
artgrids/taskforce_en.htm). See also, in the context of international standards on safety, International Convention on Load
Lines, as amended, opened for signature April 5 1966, 604 UKTS 133 (entered into force July 21, 1968); Protocol to the
International Convention on Load Lines (London), opened for signature November 11 1988, 604 UKTS 133 (entered into
force February 3, 2000).
123Notification to the Commission, above n. 47.
124Brazil requires investing c. USD$ 23.5 billion from now to 2019 in new transmission lines to keep power supply stable
due to the country’s economic growth. Brazil will have to add 36,000 kms of new transmission lines in order to integrate
new energy projects to the national power grid and several zones to the main power distribution networks. From a study
conducted by the think-tank Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) [Applied Economics Research Institute]
linked to the Brazilian government. IPEA (http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/).
125The most relevant bilateral treaties entered into by Brazil concerning shared natural resources and transnational
cooperation in the electricity area are: Tratado entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República do Paraguai para o
aproveitamento hidroelétrico dos Recursos Hı́dricos do Rio Paraná, pertencentes em condomı́nio aos dois paı́ses, desde e
inclusive o Salto Grande de Sete Quedas ou Salto de Guairá até a Foz do Rio Iguaçú [Treaty between the Federative
Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Paraguay for the hydroelectric exploitation of water resources of the Paraná River,
belonging in a condominium to both countries, from and including the Salto Grande Seven Falls or Guairá Falls to Foz do
Iguaçú River], opened for signature April 26 1973, UNTS 13164 (entered into force April 26 1973), art XXIII; Acordo Tripartite
entre Brasil, Paraguai e Argentina para aproveitamento dos recursos hidráulicos no trecho do Rio Parana desde as Sete
Quedas até a foz do Rio da Prata [Tripartite Agreement between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina for the use of water
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huge and pressing power-deficit which it is trying to overcome through strengthening the
diversification of its energy matrix and entering into international energy cooperation agreements
focused on transnational interconnections. Thirdly, Brazil has followed its own independent way
on energy issues making renewable sources its long-run energy choice since the 1970s. Over time,
this led to a situation where circa 70 per cent of the energy produced in Brazil comes from
renewable sources. The Brazilian commitment to having an even larger share of renewable energy
holds up.126 Moreover, it keeps a firm policy of domestic oil-substitution and oil-exports.127 Finally,
this particular economic model comprising emphasis on renewable energy, consistent policy, and
adequate energy planning and regulation is working fairly well.128 However, being a single
country, Brazil’s regulatory experience might not be suitable for direct replication. To address this
limitation, this paper performs a comparative analysis of energy regulation of the European Union
in a similar quest for reorganizing their energy mixes in connection with the power transmission
network issue.
The vast Amazon Basin provides an ideal setting for hydro-generation, which over time has
proven itself crucial for Brazil’s economic development.129 Brazil boasts the world’s largest capacity
for water storage and 82.8 per cent of its current energy consumption is based on hydroelectric
power of which 74.3 per cent130 comes from domestic production, and 8.5 per cent corresponds to
imported hydro-power. Conventional thermo-generation –oil, coal, and natural gas- follows in the
energy mix with 14.7 per cent. The final component of power demand is met with nuclear power,
which contributes 2.5 per cent to it. Thus, more than 80 per cent of Brazil’s power needs are met
by hydro-generation, which makes the Brazilian power market distinctive in two main aspects:
firstly, its profound reliance on a single source of energy131 and, secondly, the fact that this source
happens to be a renewable one. These features of the Brazilian power market have relevant
implications. However, as it shall be seen, such implications upon cross-border energy
Footnote continued
resources in the stretch of the Parana River from the Seven Falls to the mouth of the River Plate] opened for signature
October 19 1979, 2216 UNTS I-39389 (entered into force December 5 1979); Protocolo de Entendimiento entre los
Gobiernos de la República Argentina y de la República Federativa del Brasil sobre Cooperación e Interconexión Energética
[Protocol of understanding between the Governments of the Republic of Argentina and of the Federative Republic of Brazil
on Energy Co-operation and Interconnection], opened for signature April 9 1996 2015 UNTS I-34706 (entered into force
March 18 1998); Tratado entre el Gobierno de la República Federativa del Brasil y el Gobierno de la República Argentina
para el aprovechamiento de los Recursos Hı́dricos compartidos en los tramos limı́trofes del Rı́o Uruguay y de su afluente el
Rı́o Pepirı́-Guazú [Treaty between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the Republic
of Argentina for the exploitation of shared water resources in border sections of the river Uruguay and its affluent river
Pepirı́-Guazú], opened for signature May 17 1980 1339 UNTS I-22475 (entered into force June 1 1983); Memorandum de
Entendimiento entre la Republica Argentina y la Republica Federativa del Brasil sobre el desarrollo de Intercambios
Eléctricos y futura Integración Eléctrica [Memorandum of understanding between the Republic of Argentina and the
Federative Republic of Brazil on the carrying on of power exchanges and future electric integration], opened for signature
August 13 1997, 1995 UNTS I-34147 (entered into force August 13 1997). For a technical example on implementation see
ABB Power, Power Systems/HVDC. HVDC International Interconnection between Argentina 50Hz and Brazil 60 Hz (ABB
Power Technologies AB, 2010) POW-0037.
126The Brazilian energy planning is made up, basically, of the following policy instruments: Empresa de Pesquisa
Energética (EPE), Plano Decenal de Expansão de Energia 2019 (PDE-2019) (Ministério de Minas e Energia, Secretaria de
Planejamento e Desenvolvimento Energético, 2010) [Ten-year Energy Expansion Plan 2019 (PDE-2019)]; Empresa de
Pesquisa Energética (EPE), Programa de Expansão da Transmissão – PET 2010-2014. Estudos para licitação da expansão
da transmissão. Consolidação das análises e pareceres técnicos (Ministério de Minas e Energia, Secretaria de
Planejamento e Desenvolvimento Energético, 2009) [Transmission Expansion Plan – PET 2010-2014. Studies for the
procurement of the Transmission Expansion Procurement Studies. Consolidated analysis and technical opinions].
127Since Brazil has large proved oil reserves.
128It has placed Brazil on the verge of becoming a developed country in terms of macro-economic parameters such as
growth-rate and industrial production. All these impressive achievements – in what concerns this paper – would not have
been possible had Brazil not effectively addressed energy selection and planned and regulated the expansion and
improvement of its transmission network accordingly.
129For a generally accepted definition on sustainable development see World Commission on Environment and
Development, Brundtland Commission’s Report 1987. Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 1987); World
Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2009-2010 (WEF, 2011); World Bank, World Development Report 2010
(World Bank, 2011).
130The quota is made of 72.60 per cent share of ‘big-hydro’ (.¼30 MW) plus 1.70 per cent share of ‘small-hydro’
(,¼30 MW).
131There are 24 hydroelectric plants of greater than 1000 MW of installed capacity, including the massive 14 GW Itaipú
facility which by itself produces a fifth of Brazil’s electricity. 75 hydroelectric facilities have installed capacity of more than
100 MW. Brazil’s installed generation capacity is currently slightly more than 69 GW. PSI, Brazil Energy Handbook (PSI
Media, 2009) 14.
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transmission are quite different depending on the energy security concept used in policy and
legal terms.132
The first implication is that while having a low-cost matrix and one that is largely based on renewable
sources could surely be pointed out as a virtue, the overwhelming dependence on a particular
source makes the Brazilian mix highly vulnerable to climatic conditions, particularly, rainfall patterns
and droughts.133 Under a traditional view of national security the policy response would be – as it is in
the Brazilian case – to look for diversifying the sources of energy generation. A second implication of
the current Brazilian energy configuration is even more remarkable for, according to the same
traditional understanding of energy security, the perspective gets darker if external power-supply is
brought into the calculations. Indeed, as if a single domestic power source were not bad enough,
having to depend upon another country for the delivery of such energy is even worse per se, no matter
what source the electricity delivered is ultimately generated from. In this scenario, the problem of
security is not only one about policy (when, for how long, how, and what type of energy is used), but
one that brings in strictly legal issues regarding enforceability mechanisms under international law. It is
argued that by adopting a strategic approach to energy security embodying large-scale renewable
sources integration, international energy policies coordination,134 and power grid interconnections
would make the fact that Brazil’s energy mix is focused mostly on one generating-source in something
much less dramatic.
Brazil is aware of the danger of overdependence on hydroelectric power, thus, it has been struggling
to diversify its energy matrix by means of reinforcing biomass, biofuels,135 bagasse,136 and nuclear
energy industries in both the medium and long-term. Simultaneously, it seeks to integrate
non-conventional renewable energy sources such as wind, tidal, and solar power through clean
development mechanisms (CDM) and the Programa de Incentivo às Fontes Alternativas de Energia
Elétrica (PROINFA program), which has led to awarding several long-term power purchase agreements
for wind-projects.137 Brazil, therefore, is committed to keeping its reputation as the country having the
world’s cleanest energy matrix.138
However, a fundamental energy mix-related vulnerability of the Brazilian system is that of power
transmission.139 Brazil’s transmission high-voltage lines have north-south and west-south patterns
which have developed over time to supply energy from generation plants based in northern and
western areas, and to deliver electricity to huge urban markets, mostly located in the south. On the one
hand, the vast size of the country has led for several years to the creation of many unsophisticated
132Lei 10.847, de 15 de Março de 2004, autoriza a criação da Empresa de Pesquisa Energética – EPE e dá outras
providências [Act 10,847 of 15 March 2004 authorizing the establishment of the Energy Research Company –EPE and sets
forth other provisions], art 4(I); Lei 12.111, de 9 Dezembro de 2009 [Act 12,111 of December 9 2009]; Lei 8.666, de 21 Junho
de 1993 [Act 8,666 of 21 June 1993]; Decreto 5.184, de 16 de Agosto de 2004, cria a Empresa de Pesquisa Energética – EPE,
aprova seu Estatuto Social e dá outras providências [Decree 5,184 of August 16 2004 establishes the Energy Research
Company – EPE, authorizes its Social Charter and sets forth other provisions]; Decreto 6,685, de 10 de Dezembro de 2008,
dá nova redação aos arts. 28 e 48 do Decreto 3.520, de 21 de junho de 2000, que dispõe sobre a estrutura e o
funcionamento do Conselho Nacional de Polı́tica Energética – CNPE, e dá outras providências [Decree 6,685 of December
10 2008 restating arts 2 and 4 of Decree 3,250 of June 21 2000 on structure and functioning of the National Energy Policy
Council – CNPE, and sets forth other provisions].
133For example, Brazil suffered a drought in the late 90s which heavily impacted the generation capacity in 2001. It was a
time when quotas and rolling blackouts were imposed as drastic measures for cutting energy usage.
134S. Bourdon, S. Choteau, C. Pflanz, E. Spire, S. Bruijns, J. Vanzetta, R. Neumaier, and C. Bartocci, Harmonization of cross-
border transmission capacity allocation within the Central West Europe region (Paper presented at the 43rd Conseil
International des Grands Reseaux Electriques (CIGRE) [43rd International Council of Large Electric Resources], Paris, France,
2010) C5-102-2010.
135See also, National Program of Biodiesel Production and Use, PNPB, 2003. IPEA – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica
Aplicada (http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/) [IPEA – Applied Economics Research Institute]. See also Programa de
Incentivo às Fontes Alternativas de Energia Elétrica (PROINFA) – Ministério de Minas e Energia [Program of Incentives to
Alternative Electricity Sources (PROINFA) – Ministry of Mining and Energy] Document available at (http://www.mme.gov.
br/programas/proinfa/).
136Mostly used to fire thermal plants and refine low-cost ethanol.
137In this sense, although the hydro-generation share should decline from c.76 per cent to 67 per cent in 2020, the power
produced by alternatives sources (including wind-power, thermo, biomass, and PCHs) should double from current
8 per cent to 16 per cent in the same 10-year period.
138To do so, Brazil has approved investments in the area of renewable energy technologies for R$ 190 billions.
139Empresa de Pesquisa Energética (EPE), Programa de Expansão da Transmissão – PET 2010-2014. Estudos para
licitação da expansão da transmissão. Consolidação das análises e pareceres técnicos (Ministério de Minas e Energia,
Secretaria de Planejamento e Desenvolvimento Energético, 2009) [Transmission Expansion Plan – PET 2010-2014. Studies
for the procurement of the Transmission Expansion Procurement Studies. Consolidated analysis and technical opinions].
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transmission networks designed exclusively for delivering power to remote areas, mostly linked to
mining/forestry undertakings and rural consumer centres. In other words, a situation characterised by
the proliferation of relatively small isolated/independent power networks and the building up of
several solitary regional markets.140 Further, distances between major generating plants and urban
load-centres have progressively become larger, thus posing additional pressure upon any possible
faster implementation of generation projects; and increasing the already substantial distance-
associated power-transmission losses occurred when electricity is conveyed over thousands
of kilometres.141
The two major grids in Brazil are those placed in the south and northeast part of the country, which
were gradually implemented in a three-phase project in 1999, 2006, and 2008 through extending more
than 21,500 kms of new lines, when a basic trunk-interconnected network between the two regions was
finally achieved. However, interconnecting all these isolated systems, upgrading them, and expanding
the existing network according to the requirements of demand growth poses a major challenge for the
country.142 Internationally, Brazil has sought to arrange power-supply from its neighbours, thus,
fostering international interconnections.143 Venezuela, Argentina,144 and Uruguay are within the
framework of long-term power purchase agreements with Brazil, as well as in the multilateral realm of
regional integration frameworks.145 Brazil has the world’s largest integrated power grid, but when
something goes wrong, the domino effect is also a major inconvenience. Such a situation occurred in
November 2009 when 18 out of 26 states of the country experienced a power-outage due to lightning
strikes on transmission lines.146 The aforementioned weaknesses in transmission have played a
significant role in exposing the grid to possible failing. In response, Brazil has launched a policy aimed
140Eletrobras, Administration Report 2009 (Eletrobras, 2010) 6.
141Ibid, transmission losses are historically estimated around 16 per cent.
142In response, the government has launched a R$ 2.2 billion plan for new lines and substations to be constructed by
late 2017.
143See Acordo Tripartite entre Brasil, Paraguai e Argentina para aproveitamento dos recursos hidráulicos no trecho do
Rio Parana desde as Sete Quedas até a foz do Rio da Prata [Tripartite agreement between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina
to use water resources in the stretch of the Paraná River from the Seven Falls to the mouth of the River Plate] opened for
signature October 19 1979, 2216 UNTS I-39389 (entered into force December 5 1979); Protocolo de Entendimiento entre los
Gobiernos de la República Argentina y de la República Federativa del Brasil sobre Cooperación e Interconexión Energética
[Protocol of understanding between the Governments of the Republic of Argentina and of the Federative Republic of Brazil
on Energy Co-operation and Interconnection], opened for signature April 9 1996 2015 UNTS I-34706 (entered into force
March 18 1998); Tratado entre el Gobierno de la República Federativa del Brasil y el Gobierno de la República Argentina
para el aprovechamiento de los Recursos Hı́dricos compartidos en los tramos limı́trofes del Rı́o Uruguay y de su afluente el
Rı́o Pepirı́-Guazú [Treaty between the government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the government of the Republic
of Argentina for the exploitation of shared water resources in border sections of the river Uruguay and its afluent river
Pepirı́-Guazú], opened for signature May 17 1980 1339 UNTS I-22475 (entered into force June 1 1983); Memorandum de
Entendimiento entre la Republica Argentina y la Republica Federativa del Brasil sobre el desarrollo de Intercambios
Eléctricos y futura Integración Eléctrica [Memorandum of understanding between the Republic of Argentina and the
Federative Republic of Brazil on the carrying on of power exchanges and future Electric Integration], opened for signature
August 13 1997, 1995 UNTS I-34147 (entered into force August 13 1997). See also Decreto Legislativo N8 23, de 30.5.1973 –
Aprova o texto do Tratado de 26.4.1973 celebrado entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República do Paraguai, bem
como as Notas então trocadas entre os Ministros das Relações Exteriores dos dois paı́ses (Publicado no ‘Diário do
Congresso Nacional’ de 18.6.1973, pág. 1,659) [Law Decree Nr 23 of May 30 1973 – Approves the text of the treaty of April
26 1973 entered into the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Paraguay as well as the exchanging of notes
between foreign offices of both countries (Published in ‘National Congress Newspaper’ of June 1 1973, p 1,659]; Decreto N8
72.707, de 28.8.1973 – Promulga o Tratado de 26.4.1973, celebrado entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República
do Paraguai, bem como as seis Notas trocadas entre os Ministros das Relações Exteriores dos dois paı́ses (Publicado no
‘Diário Oficial’ de 30.8.1973, págs. 8.642-45) [Decree Nr 72,707 of August 28 1973 – Enacts the treaty of April 26 1973
entered into the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Paraguay as well as the exchanging of notes between
foreign offices’ secretaries of both countries (Published in ‘Official Gazette’ of August 30 1973, p 8, 642-45].
144ABB Power, Power Systems/HVDC. HVDC International Interconnection between Argentina 50Hz and Brazil 60 Hz
(ABB Power Technologies AB, 2010) POW-0037.
145See Montevideo Treaty constitutive of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI, Montevideo), opened for
signature August 12 1980, UNTS I-22309 (entered into force March 18 1981); Treaty establishing a common market
between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of
Uruguay (MERCOSUR) (Asunción Treaty), opened for signature March 26 2011, 2145 UNTS 252 (entered into force
November 29 1991); Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation (Brasilia), opened for signature July 3 1978, 17 ILM 1045 (entered
into force February 2 1980); Memorandum de entendimiento relativo a los intercambios eléctricos e integración eléctrica
en el MERCOSUR, MERCOSUR/MC/DEC N8 10/98 (July 23 1998) XIV CMC [Memorandum of understanding on power
exchanges and electric integration within MERCOSUR]; Constitutive Treaty of South American Union of Nations
(UNASUR)(Brasilia), opened for signature May 23 2008 (entered into force March 11 2011).
146Distance can also be held responsible for creating susceptibility of grids disruption.
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at diversifying its overwhelming reliance on hydro-generation in its energy mix and to address the lack
of upgrading of its transmission infrastructure through increasing both qualitative and quantitative
investment in the coming years, with an instance of this being the 2020-Decennial Energy Plan
(DEP-2020).147 The DEP-2020 is Brazil’s official policy instrument on energy planning and
energy-related investment drivers. It is issued by the Empresa de Pesquisa Energetica [Energy Research
Company], the Brazilian Energy Agency. It contains a ten-year energy expansion plan, forecasts of the
outcomes of energy demand, supply studies, information on energy-related projects and infrastructure
needs; as well as the outcomes of energy auctions.
To sum up, throughout its contemporary history – although not exempted from economic setbacks,
social inequalities, and political struggles – Brazil has had the merit of conducting its energy policy in a
remarkably consistent manner. It is true that this is more likely to happen when a country has vast and
natural resources relatively at hand as Brazil does, but its recent political history shows several
opportunities in which the policy might well have turned in a different direction. That, however, did not
happen. In itself, the energy policy can be viewed as having three main lines. The oldest but still crucial
is that which strives to harness the complete hydropower potential.148 The second line of policy is that
focusing on consolidating Brazil as a net oil-exporter country, as well as on expanding and deepening
its pioneering world leadership in producing low-cost biofuels. Finally, the current policy trend is to
achieve a more diversified energy portfolio, without sacrificing the distinctive ‘green-character’ of
Brazil’s historic energy mix. It aspires to achieve this latter policy objective by means of integrating
different renewable energy sources through ambitious investment plans which certainly include
expanding, upgrading, and interconnecting power networks both domestically and internationally.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper addressed transnational power-transmission through a thematic approach based on grid
interconnections and power transit. The enquiry looked at the main features of power networks, the
legal nature of international power transmission operations, and the most relevant challenges posed
by conveying electricity transnationally. It aimed at drawing lessons from the comparative analysis of
transnational (EU) and international (EEC, ECT, Brazil) case studies capable to be transposed to the
legal and regulatory fields in order to foster cross-border power grids interconnections and
unrestrained power transit in regional non-integrated realms.
An apparent conclusion is that there is no current technical limitation for power network
interconnections to be done, mostly, due to the use of international standards for electricity
transformation and the development of high-voltage superconducting technologies.149 Further,
compliance with up-to-date international standards for interconnection, minimum transfer
capacities, reliability and security must form part of any proposed regulatory framework.
Another finding is that the most important challenges that cross-border networks face are of an
economic nature regarding how to secure investments for interconnecting different transmission
systems in the context of vertically-integrated companies, the kind of disputes falling in the scope
of Article 6 ECT. On the one hand, these kind of companies – for the sake of their own corporate
interest – are fairly willing to extend their generation arms toward the transmission field, but not
equally eager to do so when it comes to investing in interconnecting systems across borders because
the process contributes to an enlarged integrated electricity market within which such companies
would see their market share diminished or have to strive to compete. For such reasons, though
the economics of potential cross-border interconnected transmission systems might appear complex,
the outlook changes considerably for the better when considering renewable instead of conventional
power sources feeding the grid on a large-scale. However, this requires a considerable regulatory effort
at international and domestic levels on expanding antitrust legal mechanisms. This is explained
because transparent market information and equalitarian access to markets – whether domestic
or international – are essential to boost ‘green’ power generation and thus greater competitiveness
(lower power prices) and efficiency (ultimately, lower marginal generation costs).
147Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME), Secretaria de Planejamento e Desenvolvimento Energético (SPE), Empresa de
Pesquisa Energética (EPE), above n. 145.
148Estimated as 260 GW, hence more than 70 per cent of it not yet developed. In this context, massive, as well as small,
hydro projects are on their way to completion to meet the country’s rapidly expanding power needs.
149For example, Sumitomo’s or Hitachi’s.
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In addition, due to diversification,150 expansion,151 competitiveness,152 and oneness153 of the
resulting power generating market as well as the consequent overall cost-reductions and
environmental advantages that it represents, the enquiry suggests that the economic outlook is
better-off if the share of renewable sources in energy mixes is predominant as in the Brazilian case
study. From the economics point of view, an international power transmission network theory is based
upon the idea of internationalizing, operating, and maintaining a common asset deemed to be,
precisely, off-the-market, but functioning simultaneously as a means to articulate the enhancement
and efficiency of two other different markets: the generation market at one end of the spectrum, and
the distribution market at the other. This proposition allows overcoming usual economic
characterizations of power grids as imperfect markets, either mono- or, at least, oligopolistic markets.
Among non-technical problems posed by interconnections is optimization: how to minimize energy
losses, particularly, in long-distance exchanges involving synchronisation of cross-border systems. In
sum, interconnections help to expand and make more efficient the power generation markets to which
these latter are attached.
More troublesome, however, are the findings in relation to policy issues that could hinder
international power transmission projects as well as those strictly legal and/or regulatory in nature,
such as those involving equality of treatment in accessing transmission services, setting reliability
standards, and the use of potential CO2 abatement mechanisms.
154 Here, the correlation between
international cooperation on the one hand, and security and sovereignty on the other, is crucial to
understand the stagnation in which an economically sensible and viable transmission project may
have been for quite a long time. This is so, because the former concept appears to have an inversely
proportional relationship with the two latter. However, in advancing the proposition that they are not
really irreconcilable, the goal of a regulatory framework to strike an appropriate balance becomes
paramount.
As seen, international law is usually considered as a minimal, fragmentary body of rules and
principles to resort to for solving a conflict presenting an international element, covering a given
law-field neither extensive nor exhaustively, more or less procedural in character, leaving the bulk of
detailed material regulation to domestic fora, and commonly unenforceable.
The enquiry proved that cross-border interconnected power networks and proper regulation on
power transit, under certain conditions (technical, economic, and political), have potential to improve
the legitimacy of international law. Indeed, the analysis presented five concrete arguments through
which international law might achieve greater levels of legitimacy and enforceability by promoting
cross-border grid interconnections.
In that sense, the analysis of the case study of the European Union is paramount. Energy-related
issues such as trans-European networks, the internal market and territorial cohesion are ‘shared
competences’ between the EU and the member states.155 Policies are, therefore, jointly agreed upon all
member states and the Union along guidelines and recommendations adopted by the Council. Since
the EU – acting alone – has no competence to implement what has been recommended, cooperation
and flexible coordination between the member states are necessary. Nonetheless, higher-rank
150In the sense that the mix is opened up to foster several types of conventional and alternative energy sources.
151Making possible, not only to extend the geographical area of the market by adding more power stations to the grid
(production side) whether in different time zones (East-West) or hemispheres (North-South), but also – and equally
important – the customer base (demand side) having access to the market.
152By progressively reducing the capital and/or operational costs, achieving economies at scale, and removing from the
market inefficient power units.
153This is the idea of a single power market taking the place of several domestic isolated power markets.
154The potential of transmission projects to reduce CO2 poses an interesting question regarding who is entitled to the
CO2 credit, the exporter power generator or the buyer/consumer on the other end of the transaction? In the author’s
opinion, the attribution of the credit for CO2 reduction can legally be neutral, namely, that the law can either decide that
one party (and not the other) is to be entitled to claim the GHG credit, split it or apportion it between the parties in any
suitable fashion. However, where the decision should not be neutral as in the legal realm is when considering the issue
from the policy point of view. Who can use the CO2 credit is a matter relevant to policy, rather than to law, which usually
plays in this a mere instrumental role. From the policy perspective and in the context of liberalised economies interacting in
a common (interconnected) power market, the credit for any CO2 reduction associated to transnational power transmission
should correspond to the users whose power demand is ultimately satisfied through ‘green’ power. However, for this to
finally occur, these users must be duly informed about the supply options as well as empowered enough to select the
renewable power provider. Therefore, the role of regulation as to the conditions of the market is once again emphasized.
155Lisbon Treaty or Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), opened for signature June 20 2007 OJ C
306/1 (entered into force December 1 2009) art 4(1)-(2).
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measures, such as regulations, directives, or decisions adopted by the Council are compulsory at
European level and their implementation – to a certain extent – has the effect of eroding traditional
views of national sovereignty. The EU law is currently regarded as a set of rules constituting ‘a separate
[autonomous] legal order, whose provisions belong neither to international law nor to the municipal
law of the member states’.156 Some of them feature direct applicability, direct effect, prevailing over
domestic law and imposing on member states liability for EU-law breaches. This supranational aspect
of the EU-law is, by far, the most important feature and its consequences over the understanding of
sovereignty are, thus, directly related with the proposition that trans-boundary interconnections are
better advanced through certain types of domestic energy portfolios: those ‘green’ and harmonized
through a large-scale (regional) single system of interconnected bulk-power grids.
Turning to current European energy policy, two relevant dimensions are found. The first one is
internal, consisting of setting up a pan-European integrated, interconnected and competitive energy
market through the development of several infrastructure projects whilst moving towards sustainable
decentralised energy production to which renewable energy sources integration is essential. Just as set
forth by Directive 2009/28/EC including mandatory national targets for the overall share of energy from
renewable sources in gross final consumption by 2020.157
However, as to European energy policy concerns, the outbound dimension has been gaining
momentum over recent years. In this new dimension, successive enlargements of the Union as well as
outside-EU projects have started influencing policy decisions. Making transmission projects possible,
such as Nabucco, ITGI, and the Southern Corridor, all essential for EU’s networks stability and security
of supply, has sparked European eagerness for placing interconnectors at the outbound limits of the
Union with third countries or maritime areas. Often presented as a manifestation of the obligation
of solidarity among member states, under a critical analysis, the placing of interconnectors across
external borders is a natural expression of the need for strengthening the external character of the EU
energy market. In this sense, it is understandable the EU’s interest in attracting Russia, North Africa, and
the Far East to the Energy Charter Treaty framework, even as defective as it is, whilst putting pressure on
work to be done for improving – particularly – the transit provision of the ECT and/or eventually
finalise its protocol on transit. Along a similar line of interests, the EU conducts permanent efforts in
trade at the WTO arena.
Applicable to both dimensions of the EU market: internal and external, further conclusions are to be
drawn from future European Court of Justice’s decisions as to mechanisms to settle disputes between
member states encompassed by an international agreement on international transmission
interconnections.
For countries not embarked in integration processes and willing to engage in an international legal
framework capable to sustain cross-border power trading and transit, both the analysis and case study
offer a number of valuable lessons, the first being the importance of setting up an area of influence,
whether territory-based as the EU model or functional (connectivity and transit), as this paper
advances. Secondly, there must be a clear identification of the transmission projects or current facilities
deemed as of mutual interest. Thirdly, an overarching operative structure, preferably enjoying
independent international status, is required. In fourth place, shared competences between states as
to the normal operation of an interconnected power grid should not be permitted and, if allowed, they
should be limited in scope, accurately framed, and restrictively construed. Fifth, participation of third
parties in transmission projects or accession to already established legal frameworks should be
allowed and encouraged. Sixth, the principle of solidarity whereby bilateral negotiations on energy
issues benefit all common stakeholders is essential and must be strengthened. Finally, competition
issues and, particularly, grid access should – in principle – be addressed domestically, but, in any
case, contracting parties should enjoy good standing at national courts and be reciprocally entitled to
request appropriate antitrust enforcement actions.
Amongst a group of states, whether neighbouring countries or not, the analysis and case study on
power transmission led ultimately to conclude that, for furthering energy mix regulatory convergence to
occur, the legal approach to it must be selective and coherent as to the relationships between transit-,
power-deficit, and power-surplus countries and include both internal legal measures, such as the
harmonization (or better still, synchronization) of energy mixes integrating renewable sources; as well
156Common Market Law Revue (1967) 483.
157As well as for the share of energy from renewable sources in transport.
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as outbound common legal decisions on cross-border grid interconnections, power trade, and
unrestricted energy transit.
In principle, there is nothing wrong in wanting to diversify energy mixes. The alternatives to do so are
multiple and fossil-based fuels, renewable sources, or most likely a combination of the two might be
used to reduce energy security tensions, whether in Brazil or the EU. However, a solution might be
to push for diversification of the energy matrix, whilst also furthering the integration and use of
environmentally-friendly energy sources, this latter option is relatively easier for Brazil rather than
Europe. Under the argument of this paper, however, this could be facilitated for both–individual
countries or regions, either integrated or not–by fostering transnational power grid interconnections.
They not only assist local integration processes where suitable, but also diversify energy matrices by
means of adopting a share on how diversified imported production might be.
Transit disputes – driven by the potential risk to a country of being deprived of energy supply as a
result of another state’s suspension of non legally-binding agreements or flawed international legal
schemes (ECT/WTO), constitute common security concerns to which the EU and Brazil have attempted
different solutions: whilst the EU is dealing with a multilateral approach, Brazil has mainly opted for
a bilateral one. Interestingly, however, in both cases international legal enforceability remains the
fundamental obstacle. Indeed, on the one hand, such agreements mostly arise from governmental acts
receiving various non-committal denominations i.e., political agreements, memoranda of under-
standing, statements of intentions, non-normative agreements, or gentlemen’s agreements. These
agreements bind only the immediate authorities and they avoid mentioning the states which,
consequently, assume no legal obligation whatsoever. The most relevant are the so-called ‘energy
integration agreements’ or ‘energy integration declarations’. On the other hand, despite the Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) general rules for trading in goods, there is still
no specific regulatory framework dealing with international power-trading and cross-border power
transit. There are no WTO specific rules on power-trading; whilst negotiations for giving Article 7 of the
ECT on transit issues further development have not yet crystallised in a complete binding protocol.158
Moreover, there are doubts about the ECT being the only regulatory domain applicable to the energy
sector.159 The ECT was originally designed as a multilateral investment treaty. In regard to power
trading, third-party access, and energy policies, the ECT is still ineffectual. Not even after the hard
negotiation and entering into effect of the so-called ‘Trade Amendment’160 (which made possible the
application by reference of the WTO rules to energy trading) such issues have been adequately
resolved.
A combined transnational market – whether achieved bilateral or multilaterally – not only
represents the apparent flow of power and trade between two or more countries.161 Although not yet
detailing what specific sources of energy are to be used for keeping power flowing across the borders,
in effect, correlative energy policies represent a somehow implied understanding between parties on
the basic acknowledgement of keeping energy policies synchronised. At this level, a practical legal
approach to an energy agreement would lead to the conclusion that building an international
interconnection node is purportedly destined to be operative anyhow, but in a sporadic way, given the
fact that arranging an interconnection is a long-term, costly, capital-intensive project, with long-term
investment rate returns, normally fixed, and so destined to be permanent. However, even setting aside
158A transit protocol draft, in negotiation since 2002, further elaborates art 7 of the ECT, but it is still subject of bilateral
consultations between the EU and the Russian Federation as to several issues such as the way in which potential
mismatches between the duration of supply and transit contracts can be avoided or the applicability of the transit protocol
inside the EU. Some progress, however, has been achieved as to the definition for available capacity, principles of transit
tariffication, transparent and non-discriminatory congestion management rules, and provisions for the creation of new
capacity. See especially EU-Directorate General for Energy, EU-Russia. Energy Dialogue. The First Ten Years: 2000-2010
(European Commission, 2011). See also, Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency
and related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA), opened for signature December 17 1994, 33 ILM 360 (entered into force
April 16 1998).
159The Energy Community Treaty, for instance, is a multilateral agreement and one of the EU complementary frameworks
derived from the EU’s external energy policy to address the issue of energy security. The treaty promotes market
integration, but also acquis transposition and implementation on potential areas for EU’s enlargement processes. Treaty
establishing the Energy Community (also known as EEC and ECSEE), opened for signature October 25 2005, OJ L 198/18
(entered into force July 1 2006).
160In 2004.
161Ross Buckley, Vailo Lo, and Laurence Boulle (eds) Challenges to Multilateral Trade. The impacts of bilateral,
preferential, and regional agreements Global Trade Law Series, vol 14, 87 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2008).
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this purposive approach, what is to be emphasized here is the capacity of energy network
interconnection agreements to cast a different light upon traditional conceptions of energy security
and, ultimately, sovereignty. These kind of ‘arrangements’ should be highly specific and
subject-matter-focused to serve the function of softening – at international level – the rigours of legal
concepts that are far less flexible in domestic realms.
In sum, a well-framed, technically-based, dedicated scope for transnational power grid
interconnections and energy transit at regional level, into ongoing international trading schemes such
as the WTO or an improved Energy Charter Treaty, would further international power trading and
synchronisation of energy matrices as drivers for international law to achieve greater enforceability.
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